



**TERRORISM: THE ACTIVITIES OF AL – SHABBAB AND
STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA: 2015 – 2020**

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Abstract

Somalia had descended into anarchy from the early 1990's following the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime. Clan division took center stage as each group sought to assert political authority rise to the emergence of warlords. Presence of a weak Transitional Federal Government and resultant governance vacuum contributed to the rise of power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which somehow managed to bring some level of order in the lawless State. Despite global and regional efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the Somalia problem, the current national government is inherently weak to effectively govern, secure its internal and external security as well as provide the political goods to its population. the study is aimed at investigating the relationship between terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab and State failure in Somalia and if this development somehow could explain the worsening of humanitarian situation that has occurred between 2015 – 2020. Anomie theory otherwise known as the social strain theory associated with an American scholar Robert K. Merton was adopted in this study as theoretical framework of analysis. The study explored the root cause of Terrorism in Somalia as a Failed State and identified Al-Shabaab's contribution to Somalia as a Failed State. The study also revealed that State-building in Somalia can only be successful by implementing a comprehensive approach based on a strong security and development policy. It is recommended in this study that the Somali government needs to take full ownership of building the institutional capacity of the state, albeit with considerable attention to local interests and the clan structure.

Keywords: Somalia, Al-Shabaab, State Failure, Terrorism and Security

Introduction

Terrorism ranks as one of the major threats to global security particularly in the 21st century. The terrorist activities of International Organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab have posed a major threat to State and Human Security in various states and regions across the world. The activities of terrorist groups are not only peculiar to Somalia alone; it is becoming a global phenomenon. Somalia from where Al-Shabaab can be traced, falls under the failed State category. Periodic indexes rank Somalia on top, plagued by conflict since the early 1990's following the fall of its last nationally recognized government of Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia, located in the horn of Africa, is a nation that has faced, and is arguably still facing today, extreme amounts of poverty, no central government, inability to control its own borders, rise of terrorist groups, and a severe lack of basic necessities to the people. Somalia had descended into anarchy from the early 1990's following the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime. Clan division took center stage as each group sought to assert political authority rise to the emergence of warlords. Presence of a weak Transitional Federal Government and resultant governance vacuum contributed to the rise of power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which somehow managed to bring some level of order in the lawless state. However, the UIC's militant wing Al-Shabaab leaders had their own motives. Most of Al-Shabaab's founding members such as Ahmed Abdi Godane and Mukhtar Robow were battle hardened militants who had fought in jihadist wars in Afghanistan. Before serving as the ICU's wing, Al-Shabaab's origins are somewhat ambiguous. Its first leader was Aden Hashi Ayro, who had earlier joined an Islamist movement called Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) in 1991. The AIAI disbanded in 1997. Sometime after 1997, Ayro joined what would be called ICU, a movement within the Somali court system that sought to establish control over Somalia. Ayro may have led a loosed group AIAI militants before joining the ICU's, meaning that Al-Shabaab may have existed in some form before serving as the ICU's military wing. However, Al-Shabaab mainly developed as part of ICU, and Ayro helped recruit and train fighters. Directed by Ayro, Al-Shabaab conducted brutal attacks that drew condemnation from local and international communities as well as much of the ICU leadership, including Hassan Dahir Awey, another former AIAI member and a top ICU leader who has reportedly served as a spiritual influence for Al-Shabaab (De Waal, 2007)

Al-Shabaab's early activities allegedly included multiple killings of international workers in Somaliland the northwestern region of Somalia between 2003 and 2005 as well as the disinterment of an Italian cemetery in 2005. Additionally, Al-Shabaab supported the use of violent retaliation against employees of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) after various ICU members were assassinated in 2005, allegedly by the TFG. The Al-Shabaab harbored motives of spreading their jihadist ideology beyond Somalia borders and establish an Islamic caliphate. The group also included hundreds of foreign jihadists among its rank. This posed a major security threat given that the rise of radical Islam presented the threat of elevating political Islam as an alternative governance system and as well, radical Somalia Islamists directly engaging in terrorism (De Waal 2007).

Somalia has served as fertile ground for international terror groups used as operational bases. The conventional wisdom holds that the environment in failed states attracts and breeds terrorism, however, the amount of empirical analysis on the subject remains extremely vague (Stewart, 2010). The ouster of UIC had the opposite effect of transforming Al-Shabaab into a more potent force, growing into the terrorist outfit it is today. Despite global and regional efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the Somalia problem, the current national government is inherently weak to effectively govern, secure its internal and external security as well as provide the political goods to its population. In essence, it remains a failed State. Rotberg (2003) refers to failed states as those that lack the capacity or are weak in exercising control over their territorial borders. He postulates that in such State, the weakened governing authority's exercise of its official power is mostly constrained either to a capital or city or in a region where it is ethnically dominant. Hence, in Somalia's case, the current national government is mainly restricted to the capital, Mogadishu, as Al-Shabaab propagates its reign of terror in large swathes of the country's territory. The war ridden country of Somalia illustrates the worst possible example of state failure in modern times.

From 2001, there has been an increase of military foreign activity in Somalia, mainly from the US, and since 2006 the conflict and situation has been intensified. Till contemporary times, every attempt to restore internal order has back fired and the country has transformed into a lawless zone and a humanitarian nightmare that doesn't seem to change in the close future. The dangers concerning failed states began

to be expressed already back in the 90's, when some academics warned the potential spillover that these countries could cause on even richer countries. Thus, the majority viewed the issue of state failure mainly as an internal problem linked to humanitarian issues. However, with the change of warfare and the emergence of new security threats, it has been affirmed that the most imminent threat to world peace no longer derives from rival military powers, but from the world's most exhausted, poor and conflicting states. These are the countries that the international community frequently refers to as "failed states".

Conceptualizing Terrorism

Terrorism is defined as the use of action by a person or group of people opposed to an authority to gain power, where the action is intended to cause great anxiety or fear in a target group larger than the immediate victims, with the goal of forcing the group to accept their political demands (Wardlaw, 1982). According to Bread and Freedom (2014), terrorism is the use of threat violence by people or group of people to cause fear, destruction even death, against unarmed civilians, property or infrastructure in a country, just for the government in power to give them their demands which is the main aim of the forceful violent actions. Their goals could be for change in status quo in the area of power, economic, ideological, religious or social order in the affected state. It could as well be to change the activities or policies of the affected country to be in line to its interaction with another group or state.

Hoffman (2004), gives a comprehensive framework of the word terrorism; (a) any action which violates the criminal laws of a state, and endanger the life, physical integrity as well as freedom or capable of causing injury on private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage as planned or about to (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the public, or any part thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or act according to particular rules or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any emergency; or (iii) create a general uprising in a country. (b) any publicity finance, adding to control, aid, motivation, persuasion, willing, threat, plot, arrange or buying of any person with the plan to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). Simon (2013), in his own view, sees terrorism as a planned action or threat by individuals or groups of individuals to instill terror, elicit

demonstrations, or result in death, primarily among civilians in the target state, in order to force the government to comply with their demands. The terrorists' goal is also to get civilians to speak in their favor so that they can carry out their plan.

Garrison (2004) sees terrorism as a weapon used to accomplish a specific goal in the society by a group of people by causing fear in the entire society. Wardlaw (1982), describes it as the use of violence by people or group of people to establish authority, as those actions are planned to affect the targeted group than the immediate with the aim of the targeted group to accede to either their political or religious needs. The basic idea is to use violence to create situations of fear in order for them to accomplish their primary aim. Stepanova (2008) in his own view describes terrorism as a type of action that brings a one-way-violence to resist people with uneven violent confrontation over a bigger opponent, it can be state or a nation-state. In the same way, terrorism can be referred to as the use of force planned to bring political differences (Jenkin, 1985).

Abdullahi (2015) sees terrorism as a crooked warfare used by terrorists to direct arms toward the achievement of larger objective that could be political, economic, and religious and what have you. Crooked warfare is an unfamiliar fight amongst non-belligerents that has to do with ambushing tactics for the destruction of stronger opponent sides. With this tactic, terrorist groups have successfully fight Britain (in Palestine), France (in Algeria) and the United States (in Vietnam) despite known war inferiority. As a result of this, it is almost impossible to defeat terrorists without being well-articulated, armed, funded as well as specially trained personnel to carry out such task. As observed by Gompert and Gordon (2008), terrorists move to take over the government in power in line with their political, economic, ideological, and religious aims. They fight to control political positions in a state or group of states in power (Kilcullen, 2006). Going by scholarly concepts presented above, it is clear that terrorism is a planned violent action used by individuals or group of individuals to accomplish their set objectives.

The growing concern of Terrorism in Somalia

The main concern for Terrorism in Somalia has been connected to the extremist group of Al-Shabaab, which has claimed affiliation with Al-Qaida. Al-Shabaab used to be quite a small organization operating within Islamic courts Union (ICU), but

when Ethiopia, backed by US, intervened in 2006 with the mission to end ICU and replace it with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) the extremist group rose to a full-blown insurgency. The development concerned many in the west and Somalia began to be termed as the new Afghanistan. The Djibouti Peace Process sponsored by UN in 2000, led to the election of Shaykh Sharif Ahmad, a former operator within the ICU, as president of the TFG. However, the election of Ahmad who raised objections among the extremists and the majority who saw him as an innovation of the west, therefore they rejected him. Instead, a new extremist group was created, Hisbul Islamiyya (HI) that allied with Al-Shabaab. The lawless condition of Somalia with no government and the chronic humanitarian distress made many in the West fear the country's potential to become safe haven for terrorism. In 2009, the TFG government declared a state of emergency and called for international support as oppositional rebels had seized most of Mogadishu, and were heading to the governmental building. They were stopped by AMISOM soldiers just in time. Al-Shabaab has carried out numerous attacks on peacekeepers operating in the country but remains unclear whether they have an aspiration to operate outside Somalia, or if they have purely national and local aims (Anderson 2009:3). Armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali army including associated human rights violations has resulted in massive civilian displacements, both within and outside Somalia. According to the UNHCR Global Trends Report 2018, the number of people who have faced forcible displacement at the end of 2017 increased to slightly over 68 million. The protracted crisis perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains among the top crises contributing to massive forced displacements in Africa. The UNHCR report further indicates that Somalia has the fifth position globally as both a refugee- and internally displaced person (IDP)-producing country (Human Rights Watch: 2007).

The significant numbers of displaced people have been attributed to the notion of a new terrorism. Ngooya, (2007) argues that there has been a shift from the old to new terrorism in the past decades. He points out some of the notable features of new terrorism: first, the prominence of religious ideologies shaping terrorism, and second, those terrorist groups tend to engage in excessive indiscriminate violence against their opponents. These features of new terrorism, to a great extent, link with the observation that new wars violate human rights indiscriminately (Human Rights

Watch: 2007). These observations demonstrate in practical terms the realities of both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, which are both religious organizations and are fighting for a related cause. In addition, their terror attacks are indiscriminate in nature and aim to produce the maximum possible impact in terms of destruction and casualties. Currently, Al-Shabaab's terror capacity is also weakening (This Day, 2008). However, the group remains a serious security threat on the continent, as evidenced in the November 7, 2022 attack on a Somali military base in the central Galgaduud region days after the area was captured by government forces (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Theoretical Framework - Anomie Theory

Anomie theory otherwise known as the social strain theory is associated with an American scholar Robert K. Merton (1938). Anomie refers to the discrepancies between culturally defined goals and the institutionalized means available to achieve these goals (Scheafer, 2002). Merton (1938) proposed a typology of deviance based upon two criteria: (1) a person's motivations or his/her adherence to cultural goals; (2) a person's belief on how to attend his/her goals (Ritzer, 2006). As presented by Merton (1938), there are five types of deviance based upon these criteria: Conformity (acceptance of cultural goals and adaptation to social change); Innovation (acceptance of cultural goals, non-recognition of legal means to achieve the goals); Ritualism (lowering/abandoning the cultural goals and maintaining legal means to achieve them); Retreatism (rejection of cultural goals and legal means); and Rebellion. Combating the objectives and the means to change social structures, according to Merton (1938), people from lower social strata tend to resort to such means because they have fewer opportunities than higher strata to achieve cultural goals (Wickert, 2019). In applying this theory to explain terrorism, it is pivotal that crime comes from the class of innovators, retreatants, and rebels. Anomie's theory offered an explanation on why people adopt terrorism and perpetuate it. The Al-Shabaab insurgency in Africa has also been at the center of public discussions, and has led to a call for increasingly comprehensive national and international counterterrorism responses. The group has also significantly contributed to instability on the continent and further polarized an already fragmented Somali society.

Somalia's Al-Shabaab and its Islamic extremism can be traced back to the mid-1970s, when the group began as an underground movement opposing the repressive and corrupt regime of Siad Barre. This rebellion was coupled with the Barre regime's failure to resolve economic challenges that Somalis who were living outside the colonial borders faced. The US Department of State had noted that since its establishment, the Al-Shabaab terrorist group has remained a notorious group and poses a serious security threat in Africa, having successfully regained territory in Somali's southern and central regions (Rienner, 2000). Although Al-Shabaab predominantly controls most rural parts of south and central Somalia, the group's military influence has been felt throughout the country through fear and intimidation tactics.

Armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali army, including associated human rights violations, has resulted in massive civilian displacements, both within and outside Somalia. According to the UNHCR Global Trends Report 2018, the number of people who have faced forcible displacement at the end of 2017 increased to slightly over 68 million. The protracted crisis perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains among the top crises contributing to massive forced displacements in Africa. The UNHCR report further indicates that Somalia has the fifth position globally as both a refugee- and internally displaced person (IDP)-producing country (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

The root cause of Terrorism in Somalia as a Failed State

The root cause of the Somali crisis can be traced back to several factors such as its historical formation being linked to colonialism, lack of natural resources, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, repressive state and the Somali culture that encourages the use of violence as a means of dispute resolution (Henry, 2010). Africa Watch (1990) explains that, the Somali crisis started from Siad Barre regimes when he became intoxicated with power and was corrupt and unpopular. This made citizens to lose confidence in his style of leadership, the despotic regime that lasted for 20 years and the citizens subsequent protests led to a heavy crackdown on citizens to the point where in May 1988, bombs were dropped on Somali citizens. This regime became a terror as it was brutal using force against opposition and incarcerating them without trials. There was torture mass execution of religious

leaders, businessmen, politicians leading to the outright violations of human rights of citizens. (Africa Watch, 1990).

The early hours of July 16, 1989, the day of Eid al-Adhan, a Muslim holy day, Barre's force cracked down on religious leaders and arrested six prominent Imams after morning prayer killing a crowd of worshippers more than 1,000 innocent persons were killed and were buried at Jazira beach. During that period about 50,000 to 60,000 civilians died as a result of hostilities between government forces and insurgent groups. The major rebels' movements were; The United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali National Movement (SNM). (Africa Watch: 1990). In January 1991, Said Barre was ousted from power by the rebel movements, but his ouster was the beginning of Somali crisis as there was schism between the USC and SNM. While USC controlled the southern region including Mogadishu, the SNM controlled the northern region, the North further seceded from Republic of Somalia in March 1991 and this event provided grounds for factionalism while the then interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed controlled SNA, other factions was controlled by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid on the USC faction. The power tussle between these factions on who becomes the President deteriorated to the point where fierce battle escalated and free guns and other ammunitions got into the hands of citizens as the environment became rife for banditry, brutality and other forms of violence. Citizens were no longer the focus as there were no concerns about their plight. In November 1991, violence erupted on a full scale and by March 1992 an estimated 41,000 persons most of whom were civilians-women and children lost their lives. (Council on Foreign Relations: 2016)

The Somali crisis is such that, huge human suffering of Somali's is as a result of the spillover effect of civil unrest all across the Horn of Africa. The long-term impact is that, the conflict has adverse impact on the country's peace, stability, security and development. There is continued loss of life as a result of intermittent fighting, famine continues to rage, raping and killing of women, small arms proliferation, displacement of persons and the resultant flow of refugees into the Arabian states and Eastern Africa. (Council on Foreign Relations: 2016). According to UN under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, 300,000 have fled the city and "in terms of numbers and access to them, Somalia is a worse displacement crisis than Darfur or Chad." (U.N. Humanitarian Affairs: 2007).

Armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali army including associated human rights violations has resulted in massive civilian displacements, both within and outside Somalia. The protracted crisis perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia remains among the top crises contributing to massive forced displacements in Africa. Insecurity has increased in the neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, due to proliferation of small arms, massive influx of refugees, many of whom are ex-soldiers who continue to exhibit dubious and heinous intent. Banditry is rife especially in North Eastern Kenya; this has reduced socio-economic activities and the free movement of the persons in the region as a result of insecurity. (U.N. Humanitarian Affairs: 2007).

Said Barre's desire for a greater Somalia made him to attack Ethiopia in 1977 in a bid to reclaim Ogaden (where majority of Somalis are found) in Eastern Ethiopia. This act alone destabilized the peace in the horn of Africa. The Somali crisis continues to witness cross-border crime and banditry, the influx of refugees and the proliferation of arms and drugs is seriously creating instability in the Horn of Africa. Arms circulation is wide spread in the country but is also finding its spread into neighboring countries. Hargesia (northwestern Somalia) is a flourishing arms market, while Burao (capital of the Togdheer region and the second largest city in Somaliland) is an open arms market that serves the whole region and from where arms find their way to Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and other countries. The availability of ammunitions in Somalia was highly effective in the increase of criminal activities in the region as cattle rustlers, bandits and rebel groups acquire weapons from Somalia (Blook, 2009).

Cattle rustling and banditry has changed from low intensity to high intensity. Conflict has exacerbated, making large areas of the Horn of Africa a lawless region to govern as there has been inter-state conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia in a border dispute between 1960 and 1964, Ogaden War between 1977 and 1978, border class in 1982 and cross-border warfare in the chaotic era with Ethiopia's involvement in the Somali crises since 1998 till date. Ethiopia has been accused of supporting factions/warlords like the Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC), Musisudi, General Mohammad Said Morgan, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Rehanwein Resistance Army (RRA). From 1996, Ethiopia has continued to intervene in Somalia. Ethiopian troops reportedly raided the Somali border town of Balanballe

in pursuit of members of the Al-Ittihad – Al-Islamiya group, which has been to unite Ethiopia's eastern Ogaden region with Somalia. In late 2006 and early 2007, Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu, the Somali capital to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Islamist Court Union (ICU). The height of the conflict saw militia leaders having a loose control over their followers, and clan elders lost influence over their members. Weapons were readily made available to them by warlords. Culture of impunity, in which pillaging, destruction of property, and rape became common place particularly in south–central Somalia (Conflict Analysis Regional Report, 2004).

Human Rights violations and put a premium on demilitarization, but it too has been responsible for excesses against opponents. UNICEF report (2004) point out that income earnings, rather than belief in any social or political ideology, motivated these young boys to join the militias as child soldiers. Another adverse effect of the Somali crisis and its impact on citizens is the fact that Somalia has become a breeding ground for recruiting terrorists as a country now prone to terrorist bases or organization being established there in recent time was largely due to a legacy of interminable lawlessness under the TFG, extreme poverty, and desperate drive for resources'. The impact of the piracy in the wake of Somali crisis is not only affecting the Somalis, Horn of Africa region, but also the international community because piracy of the Somali coast has become a threat to international shipping. (UNICEF Report: 2004) United Nations Report (March, 2009) have suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia is caused by illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels that have, according to Somali fishermen, severely constrained the ability of locals to earn a living and forced many to turn to piracy instead. In addition, the UN Report (2009) have alleged that about seventy percent of the local coastal communities "strongly support the piracy as a form of national defense of the country's territorial waters", and that the pirates believe they are protecting their fishing grounds and exacting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen. On 23rd April 2009, at International Donors Conference: Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon told delegates at a donor's conference sponsored by U.N. that "Piracy is symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground", and that "more security on the ground will take less piracy on the sea." Anarchy and Insecurity has impacted negatively on Somalia as a nation and its people as well as Africa and the

international community. Many deaths of foreigners have been reported along the Gulf of Aden as a result of piracy where there is kidnapping and hijacking of ships. With the dimension the crisis has taken, it is very obvious that the crisis has affected not only Somalis but neighboring African states especially the Horn of Africa and international community because of its strategic littoral importance. (Ban Ki-Moon, 2009)

Al-Shabaab: The making of Somalia as a Failed State

Al-Shabaab was formed in the first few year of the new millennium; the group began as a militant remnant of a previous Somalis Islamic Organization, al-Ittihad al Islamiyya (AIAI). In 2000, only the youngest militant members remained. These members, including Sheikh Hassan Tahir Awey, re-informed into Al-Shabaab and were incorporated into the ICU as the courts' radical youth militia. As Awey's importance grew within the ICU, he passed leadership of Al-Shabaab on one of his followers, Aden Hashi Ayro. Ayro would lead Al-Shabaab and its roughly 400 fighters as part of the campaign against Mogadishu's warlords in early 2006, helping the ICU to gained control of the capital. According to an estimate of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2004), Al-Shabaab, the most significant terrorist group in Somalia, has carried out approximately 550 terrorist attacks (mostly within Somalia but also outside of it, notably in Kenya and Uganda), killing more than 1,600 and injuring more than 2,100 individuals, since its inception in 2007. It is estimated that Al-Shabaab has 1,000 to 4,000 fighters of which 200 to 400 are foreigners (from Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kenya, the United States and other African states). (Global Terrorism Database: 2004)

The primary objective of Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliated organization, is to establish an Islamic state (caliphate) and topple the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), which is administered from Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is associated with the strict Salafi-Wahabist doctrine of Islam which calls for governance according to Sharia (Islamic) Law (Ramadane, 2014). The group also calls for a cultural revival and revitalization of Islam among the population. Al-Shabaab is currently in control of southern and central Somalia and has established Al-Shabaab branches and Islamist administrations throughout these territories, each running a mosque, a school and a youth club. While Al-Shabaab is the major jihadist

group in Somalia, Hizb al Islamare is equally violent. The Hizb al Islam, which separated from Al-Shabaab in 2012, controls Beledweyne and administers the Hiraan region, as well as Afgoi district near Mogadishu. Hizb al Islam is presently not believed to be affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda's connection with Somali jihadist operations started from 2008 with individuals associated with Al-Qaeda from the Middle East and Asia participating in Al-Shabaab attacks, as well as in the illicit trade of charcoal out of Somalia to neighboring countries and the Middle East. The involvement in illicit trade not only generated money to support Al-Shabaab's activities but also furnished Al-Qaeda's access to the booming illegal arms market in the region (Radio France International (RFI) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (Ramadane, 2014).

The organizational structure of Al-Shabaab is important to understand how the group operates. It is known that the leaders of Al-Shabaab operate with a Shura Council (Islamic advisory council) which sets the agenda for the group, i.e. to establish an Islamist state and apply Islamic law as a code of conduct for Muslims throughout Somalia. While Al-Shabaab's founder-leader Ahmed AbdiGodane (a.k.a Abu Mukhtar Abu Zubair) along with other leaders such as Ibrahim Haji Jama al Afghani, Mukhtar 'Abu Mansur' Robow, Fu'ad Muhammad Khalaf 'Shongole' (Al-Shabaab's spokesman), 'Ali Mahamoud Rage' and preacher 'Abd al QadirMu'min' were likely to have been a part of the Shura Council, its present membership is not known. Al-Shabaab's operating structure is based on networks of a number of small cells (nodes), where some (hubs) provide centralized direction and communication linkages to others that are decentralized and are many in number (while some cells may operate entirely independently from hubs). Hubs channel financial aid and guidance to the nodes without asserting active control or direction. Nodes identify targets and initiate terrorist operations largely independent of the hubs, but making use of the hub's resources and assistance. While the ties between hubs and nodes are weak, ties within the node itself are very strong and quite resistant to erosion. Consequently, nodes have been extremely difficult to penetrate, monitor or detect. The terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab have thus largely been carried out by these small local groups of individuals who receive instructions from the Shura Council (generally) via the hubs, but have the operational capability to carry out attacks on their own. (Ramadane, 2014)

Despite the heavy presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007 in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to maintain peace and stability, (AMISOM's chief mandate is to consolidate peace and stability in Somalia by helping the new government to contain, repulse attacks and work towards defeating Al-Shabaab, the scope of Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities continue to deepen inside the country as well as outside of Somalia not only in numbers but in terms of networking and expansion of the illegal arms trade with actors from other conflict zones in close proximity, such as South Sudan. (Ramadane, 2014)

Finally, the lack of governance in the South, provided Al-Shabaab with a fertile source of revenue with which to fund its period of emergence. Included the southern area into which Al-Shabbab had retreated was the important port city of Kismayo. Control of this area and its port provided Al-Shabaab with several sources of revenue. While hard numbers are difficult to obtain, estimates are that Al-Shabaab has been able to bring in roughly \$1 million per month by taxing goods entering through the port and at the checkpoint across its territory. The port is also an important link to the Kenyan sugar trade, providing one many tie between businessmen in that country and Al-Shabaab. To supplement its revenue, Al-Shabaab began extorting the multitude of nongovernmental aid organizations working to feed the severely food-deprived southern Somalia population. In 2009, the U.N. World Food Program suspended its operations in southern Somalia after discovering that local Somalis subcontractors had funneled several million dollars to Al-Shabaab. Without any sort of government to stop it, Al-Shabaab's control over the south provides the group with significantly greater revenue than it had previously enjoyed, serving to bolster the group's growth and this really contributed to state failure in Somalia. (Darsso, 2009)

Challenges in dealing with Terrorism in a Failed State

There are various factors which impact on efforts in dealing with terrorism in the context of failed states whether at state level, regional or international aspect. To begin with, drawing from the various definitions and characteristics of failed states, the issue of a state's capacity to exercise effective control over its geographically defined territory is a major challenge. For example, Piazza talks of failed and failing states as being those incapables of applying the monopoly of legitimate force over

their territory and hence struggles to secure their defined national boundaries. Rotberg (2003) argues that in addition to the inability to exercise power within their geographical territory, failed states also struggle from what he refers as 'administrative incapacity'. This administrative incapacity manifests itself in the form of such states inability to provide population with the political goods they require and as is expected of a modern state. Such political goods include security, functioning governance institutions such as Judiciary and bureaucracy (Civil Service), education and healthcare provision among others. Populations in failed states are deprived of political and economic resources which they need for their survival, a situation which raises the potential of pushing them into seeking for such resources by any means including resorting to political violence. That the ramification of such are that citizens of failed states become vulnerable to manipulation by international terrorist organizations hence posing a danger to global security (Rotberg: 2003). Hence, states that struggle or fail to effectively govern their territories and provide the requisite political goods to their populations may serve as attractive options for international terrorist organizations to infiltrate and operate in. This is because a state that is ineffective in defending its territory makes it easy for its authority to be challenged by non-state actors. Such states are more prone to civil war, prolonged armed struggle between their governments and non-state actors such as guerrilla movement, rebel groups or even terrorist organizations due to the prevalent lawlessness brought about by the state' weakness in projecting power over their territory and utilizing the monopoly of force over any other actor. (Rotberg: 2009). Takeyh and Gvosdev note that one main factor which makes failed states attractive to terrorist groups is that they enable acquisition of adequate territory which they are in total control of hence it enables them to install their training and communication facilities, arms storage and conduct their training and planning of attacks unhindered. Another challenge is the issue of state sovereignty. State sovereignty is the supremacy of State within its defined territory as well as the capacity to independently engage in international relations with other actors. All states in the international system are regarded as equal regardless of their territorial size, population, economic and military strength among other aspect. Hence failed states lack the capacity to effectively govern their own territories which would serve to prevent or disrupt activities by terrorists, it would be asking for too much from them to expect them to

deal with the manifestation of terrorism within their territory. That leaves the international community or more particularly those states directly affected or endangered by terrorism to take pre-emptive actions against terrorist organizations. Such actions include direct military actions within states which harbor terrorists, which pose dilemma due to the competing interests of the sanctity of respecting state sovereignty vis-à-vis a state's right to exercise self-defense against its internal security. That is why states like Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Iraq has been unable to effectively govern themselves as the resultant infiltration or emergence and growth of terrorist groups notably Al-Qaeda and its affiliate. (Takeyh & Gvosdev: 2002: 225).

Another factor is the issue of religion whereby the fight against terrorism is particularly by the Western powers is viewed by some Muslim world as targeting their faith. The terrorist organizations on the other hand have effectively applied propaganda rhetoric to propagate this view in their favor hence attracting more followers and sympathizers as well as willing recruits and financial support. Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Al-Shabaab among other radical Islamic terrorist groups have always sought to depict the West as anti-Islam and view their activities against terrorists in places such as Somalia, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan as targeting Muslims. Hence, counter-terrorism activities in those ungoverned spaces are not viewed in terms of as a response to manifestation of terrorism in failed states which are incapable of dealing with terrorism but rather as imperialistic actions by Christian western powers against Muslim in those lands (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 2003).

Alternative options in responding to Terrorism in a Failed State

The twin issues of terrorism and failed states are now not a new phenomenon in the 21st Century but the interrelationship between the two gained prominences in post 9/11 world. The link between state failure and its impact on the manifestation of terrorism has seen the international community pursue various options in responding to this issue. As noted by Rotberg (2009), it is vital to understand the factors which are central to state failure in the war against terrorism. Some states have taken it upon themselves and applied preventive and pre-emptive strategies to deter terrorists from attacking them or their allies. For instance, in response to 9/11, the U.S. military

action in Afghanistan was a pre-emptive and preventive strategy. Having established Al-Qaeda was behind the attack, the U.S. declared a global war on terrorism and sought to pursue terrorists in all places they sought sanctuary in and operated from. There was a shift in focus among U.S. policy makers in relation to failed states which previously were viewed mainly in the humanitarian aspect to being regarded as posing a major threat to international security.

Afghanistan served as the main operational base for Osama bin Laden-led group where it enjoyed the protection of the Taliban regime. The issue of state sovereignty did not get in the way of the U.S. military action to invade a sovereign state. Tutuianu, 2013 observes that in regard to Afghanistan prior to 9/11, the issue of state sovereignty was 'rather fictitious (legal) instead of de facto'. This meant that state sovereignty was more in the legal aspect than in practice in that, having been captive off a Taliban regime that gave protection to and supported an internationally recognized terror group, Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks and other such as that on the USS Cole in Yemen and U.S. Embassies' bombing in East Africa, the U.S. was justified in applying pre-emptive and preventive action by military invading Afghanistan to wage war on the terrorists.

In Kenya and Ethiopia's case, the presence of close to one million Somali refugees also poses a major security threat. The Kenyan military operation has among its other objectives sought to not only defeat Al-Shabaab, but also stabilize the country hence creating conducive environment that would that would lead to repatriation of their refugees back to their home nation. A situation of perpetual conflict in Somalia remains security nightmare for both Kenya and Ethiopia. Hence both states can justify their military activities within Somalia aimed at defeating Al-Shabaab militants as well as stabilizing the country so that it ceases being a sanctuary for terrorists, the sovereignty of the Horn of Africa nation notwithstanding.

A highlight by the U.S' National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) 'states that have sovereign rights also has sovereign responsibilities. The UN, through Resolution 1373 of the Security Council also obligates all its members' states to cooperate as one strategy of preventing terror attacks through adoption of various strategies including denying terrorists' sanctuaries, suppressing terrorism financing as well as putting in place measures to prevent terrorists' movement within their territories. Therefore, in regard to state sovereignty, rogue, failed or weak states can

no longer use it as a 'defense to block efforts by other state actors or a global coalition to directly intervene in pursuing terrorists within their territories or seeking to stabilize such states among other intervention in the global war against terrorism, particularly in the context of failed states. (U.S' National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 2003)

In states such as Somalia, for example, a starting point would be first to stabilize the state by seeking a peaceful resolution to their prolonged conflict; quite a tall order given the complexities of the causes, factors and actors involved in the conflicts. In Somalia for instance, despite the numerous complexities of the conflict that has raged on for close to three decades, there seems to be some headway being made in that there is more nationally recognized federal national government in place despite its restricted authority and challenge by Al-Shabaab and regional efforts by African Union (AU), through AMISOM as well as the military operation/presence of Kenyan forces seems to have made substantial gains in weakening the influence and control of the terror group across the country. Therefore, more regional and international support to the federal government, intelligence sharing to aid counter-terrorism efforts, strengthening the military and police capacity through supply of arms and training among other interventions would go a long way in boosting its ability to deal with Al-Shabaab and other armed groups/militants which threaten the stability of the Somali nation. (Ramadane, 2014)

Failed states are also attractive to terrorist groups since they serve as viable transit routes or staging grounds. For example, Somalia and Sudan were used by Al-Qaeda as staging ground and transit routes for the terrorists who carried out the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Al-Qaeda's Fazul Mohammad and accomplices are reported to have used Somalia as a transit/staging ground for their attacks on Israel tourists in Kikambala, North Coast of Mombasa in 2002.

It is averred that the potential for terrorist groups to emerge from and thrive undetected is less in stable states compared to failed states due to the fact that in the former, they have capacity to secure their territories from internal and external threats, having functioning government hence law enforcement and other governance institutions are effective and provide basic social goods to their population such as security, education and health services and a thriving economy. Thus, in state such as Japan, USA, Canada, United Arab Emirate, Australia, for

example, it is difficult for terrorist groups to operate as freely as they do in Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan where they control large territories, run training camps and weapons storages.

Lastly, the relationship between states failure and terrorism is not a simple one. Some of the challenges in dealing with the issue of terrorism in failed states also emerged and ranged from the issue of state sovereignty, the anarchic nature of international system, the issue of religion, the link between organized crime and terrorism, great power politics between and among major world powers, the issue of state capacity/capability as well as the inherent factors within failed state such as absence or weak law enforcement mechanism/authorities among other challenges. The notion of human security came into discussion after the cold war as it became evident that present concept of security failed to encapsulate the new kind of wars that appeared. Although, security issues always had been highly prioritized by governments in fact there are few questions that bring the same alertness and action in the political sphere as the one concerning security. Nevertheless, people continue to survival on a daily basis, on “existential survival”. Issues concerning healthcare, poverty, human rights, environmental degradation was not included in the traditional security approach and for that reason states struggled on how to secure their people. The securing of food, is another vital element when discussing human security. Starvation and famine are a serious threat in a third world, and each day someone dies as a direct result of starvation. The access to food is depending upon the production, and for countries that are stricken by war, production on soils and farms becomes scarce as people become dislocated. Many failed states also suffer from structural violence, which causes the situation to become even worse. The absence of a functioning government is most likely to cause institutions and social security lines to slowly decline.

Conclusion

The most destructive groups are located in weak or failed states. Populations in failed states are deprived of political and economic resources which they need for their survival, a situation which raises the potential of pushing them into seeking for such resources by any means including resorting to political violence. The potential for terrorist groups to emerge from and thrive undetected is less in stable states

compared to failed states due to the fact that in the former, they have capacity to secure their territories from internal and external threats, having functioning government hence law enforcement and other governance institutions are effective and provide basic social goods to their population such as security, education and health services and a thriving economy. Terrorists have a long history of operating within very different political and social environment, and in spite of certain nations demonstrating political stability and all the parameters necessary to enhance governance, sometimes terrorism tends mostly to be local directed as particular local institutions. Therefore, the relationship between weak or failed states and the organization of terrorist activities is not a simple one. State-building in Somalia can only be successful by implementing a comprehensive approach based on a strong security and development policy. The Somali government needs to take full ownership of building the institutional capacity of the state, albeit with considerable attention to local interests and the clan structure. Full commitment of the international community is required for the provision of humanitarian aid, development and security support throughout this process. Perhaps a more important question is whether Al-Shabaab's priority is to take political power in Somalia or transform Somalia society into a strict Islamic state. Different Al-Shabaab leaders probably have different priorities, but for the time being the organization seems committed to achieving both goals.

Recommendations

The study puts forward the following recommendations:

1. There is need for international intervention in Somalia especially against the deadliest group of Al-Shabaab which has grown more powerful in the state of Somalia. The international community should not only continue to engage in Somalia but ensure that its engagement is more robust and coordinated. The special representative of the UN Secretary General should work through and with the support of all states and international organizations with special interests, expertise and influence.
2. The state authority being limited in Mogadishu alone is a great hindrance to democracy, power and stability. The international community, especially the United Nations, the African Union and other regional bodies have to

structure a concrete security arrangement that will intensify security efforts and strategize the modus operandi of systematically taking over the realms of power of the state from terrorist's groups.

3. This will eventual ensure that the government will ensure strong enforcement of laws and structures in their political system to discourage violence among citizens and prevent anarchy which serves as a cover for terrorist activities.
4. In order to end the recruitment of the citizens into terrorist groups, government, especially in Somalia should ensure the provision of employment, social amenities, as well as build in the mind of the populace that it is responsive to their needs. By doing these, recruitment, engagement and participation in terrorist activities will be reduce.

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