concentrates. This is in agreement with Brian (2010) who reported that dry matter intake (DMI) tends to increase with increasing dietary protein level but decrease with increasing energy density.

The results also revealed that values of feed conversion ratio (FCR) and feed conversion efficiency (FCE) which ranged from 2.01 to 3.24 and 0.31 to 0.49 respectively, were highly (P<0.01) significant across treatments. It is concluded that with the exception of initial live weights, all the feed ingredients used in formulating the experimental diets positively affected all the parameters measured across treatments.

**Conclusion and Recommendation:** It is concluded that with the exception of initial live weights, all the feed ingredients used in formulating the experimental diets positively affected all the parameters measured across treatments. Therefore the feed ingredients could be used to formulate the trial diets for cattle fattening.

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POLITICAL DIMENSION OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

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Abstract
Prior to autonomy and eventual independence, Southern Sudan was a region of the Republic of Sudan, which had achieved independence from the co-rule of Great Britain and Egypt in 1956. Sudan had been divided culturally and ethnically between the majority-Muslim Arab north and the majority-Christian Nilotic south. Southern leaders and members of the Sudan Defense Force cited oppression of the North as reason for growing tensions between the two regions. This led to the formation of the separatist Anyanya rebel army, who sought regional autonomy. The First Sudanese Civil War was a 16 year conflict between the Anyanya and the Sudan People’s Armed Forces. The war ended with the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which granted autonomy to the Southern region of Sudan. After an 11 year period of resolution, the then President Gaafar Nimeiry declared all of Sudan, including the autonomous Southern region, to be an Islamic state. This declaration ended the Addis Ababa Agreement and removed autonomy from Southern Sudan, Sparking the Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (also known as the Naivasha Agreement) between the government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Southern Sudan regained its status as an autonomous region of the Republic of Sudan from 2005 to 2011, when South Sudan gained independence. On 9th January 2005, the Government of Southern Sudan was established after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. John Garang, the former rebel leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, became President of the Government of Southern Sudan. A constitution was adopted in December 2005. The paper has observed three or four political dimensions in the Southern Sudan conflict, although there may be other political views expressed previously by other likeminded, such as Federal State outcry, the Collegial Presidency (CP) and
many other views. The views are the Elites' dimensions of the conflict, the Tribal and the International communities' dimension. They are not absolutely exhaustive, thus, leaving room for other observers to add their opinions. The paper has also used the secondary source of data by gathering relevant literature on discussing the issue of Southern Sudan Conflict. For peace to be rooted in many African countries our leaders must give priority concern to the national spirit and consolidation rather than given priority concern to ethnic affiliation and the African leaders must operate clean democratic governance that can meet the need and the desire of general public.

**Keywords:** Ethnic Conflict, National Spirit, Corruption and Good Governance

**Introduction**

South Sudan officially known as the Republic of South Sudan is a [landlocked country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landlocked_country) in East-Central Africa. It gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan in 2011, making it the most recent sovereign state with widespread recognition. Its capital and largest city is [Juba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juba). According to Wudu, S (2018) has cited that the South Sudan is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest and the Central African Republic to the west. It includes the vast swamp region of the Sudd, formed by the [White Nile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Nile) and known locally as the *Bahr al Jabal* (Arabic: بحر الجبل), meaning "Mountain Sea". Sudan was occupied by Egypt under the Muhammad Ali dynasty and was governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium until Sudanese independence in 1956. Following the [First Sudanese Civil War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Sudanese_Civil_War), the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was formed in 1972 and lasted until 1983. A [second Sudanese civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War) soon broke out, ending in 2005 with the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Peace_Agreement). Later that year, southern autonomy was restored when an Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan was formed. South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, following 98.83% support for independence in a [January 2011 referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Southern_Sudan_referendum). It has suffered [ethnic violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnicity_in_South_Sudan) and endured a [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War) since 2013.

South Sudan has a population of 12 million, mostly of the [Nilotic peoples](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nilotic_peoples), and it is demographically among the youngest nations in the world, with roughly half under 18 years old. The majority of inhabitants adhere to [Christianity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianity) or various [traditional faiths](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_South_Sudan). The country is a member of the United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. And is a party to the [Geneva Conventions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions). As of 2019, South Sudan
ranks lowest in the latest UN World Happiness Report, second lowest on the Global Peace Index, and has the third-highest score on the American Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index. (Gordon, 2014)

Statement of Problem
The independence of Southern Sudan from Northern Sudan was facilitated by voting on the referendum which has began on 9 January 2011. On January 12, 2011 after three days of voting, representatives of the SPLM announced that, according to their estimates, the 60 percent turnout threshold required for the referendum's validity (corresponding to around 2.3 million voters) had been reached. Official confirmation came later the same day, when the referendum commission released a statement announcing that turnout would "exceed" the required 60 percent threshold (VOA, News 2011)

According to Al Jazeera English Report (2011) has cited that the Mohamed Ibrahim Khalil, chairman of the referendum commission, said 83 percent of eligible voters in the south and 53 percent in the north had voted. Over 90% of those who voted supported independence, which was officially granted on July 9, 2011 Salva Kiir Mayardit was appointed as South Sudan’s first president, and Riek Machar was appointed as South Sudan’s first vice-president.

Between 9 and 15 January 2011, a referendum was held to determine whether South Sudan should become an independent country and separate from Sudan. 98.83% of the population voted for independence. According to Fick, M (2011) has pointed how South Sudan formally became independent from Sudan on 9 July, 2011 although certain disputes still remained, including the division of oil revenues, as 75% of all the former Sudan's oil reserves are in South Sudan. The region of Abyei still remains disputed and a separate referendum will be held in Abyei on whether they want to join Sudan or South Sudan. The South Kordofan conflict broke out in June 2011 between the Army of Sudan and the SPLA over the Nuba Mountains.

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the 54th independent country in Africa and since 14 July 2011, South Sudan is the 193rd member of the United Nations. On 27 July 2011, South Sudan became the 54th country to join the African Union. (UN, 2011)

In 2011 it was reported that South Sudan was at war with at least seven armed groups in 9 of its 10 states, with tens of thousands displaced. The fighters accuse the government of plotting to stay in power indefinitely, not fairly representing and supporting all tribal groups while neglecting development in rural areas. Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) also operates in a wide area that
includes South Sudan. Inter-ethnic warfare that in some cases predates the war of independence is widespread. In December 2011, tribal clashes in Jonglei intensified between the Nuer White Army of the Lou Nuer and the Murle. The White Army warned it would wipe out the Murle and would also fight South Sudanese and UN forces sent to the area around Pibor. In March 2012, South Sudanese forces seized the Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan in the province of South Kordofan after conflict with Sudanese forces in the South Sudanese state of Unity. South Sudan withdrew on 20 March, 2012 and the Sudanese Army entered Heglig two days later on the stated date.

Research Questions
This paper has raised the following questions:

i. Does Southern Sudan Independence in 2011 have any progression effects on the lives of Southern Sudan?

ii. What are causes of 2013 political crisis of Southern Sudan?

iii. What are the ways of addressing political crisis in Africa?

Research Objective
This paper has the general objectives of analyzing the political dimension of crisis of Southern Sudan, and has the following specific objectives:

i. To determine the impact Southern Sudan Independence on the lives of the peoples of Southern Sudan

ii. To find out the causes of 2013 Southern Sudan Political crisis

iii. To determine the ways of addressing political crisis in Africa.

2013–2014 civil war and reform
In July 2013, Kiir dismissed all his ministers, including Vice President Riek Machar, with the official aim of reducing the size of government. However, Machar said it was a step towards dictatorship and that he would challenge Kiir for the presidency.

On 14–15 December 2013, an attempted coup d’état was put down. Intermittent fighting then continued amid ceasefire breakdowns during the ensuing civil war. According World Population Prosperity Report of November, 2019 that the international community’s concern grew over more than 1,000 deaths, a humanitarian catastrophe of over a million refugees, and man-made famine. In the meantime, the SPLM factionalised into the SPLM-Juba led by President Salva Kiir and the SPLM-IO led by former Vice President Riek Machar. Kiir told the
sixty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly that Machar was to blame for the conflict (UNDP, 2019)

Amidst a party power struggle, the government was blamed by Pagan Amum for not allowing the unarmed opposition group Political Parties Leadership Forum and its leader Lam Akol from taking part in the negotiations. Kiir also dismissed his ethnic colleague Rebecca Garang, widow of the SPLM’s founder John Garang, in August alleging her criticism made her anti-government. Relations with China, South Sudan’s largest foreign investor, and Uganda also improved after the SPLM-IO visited Beijing and opened a liaison office in Kampala and accepted an Ugandan troop presence in Juba, in a move away from criticising Uganda’s initial support for the government.

As cited by Worsnip, P (2015) Following sanctions against some of the leadership on both sides, including an arms embargo that was unknowingly violated by China’s NORINCO until the sales were then canceled by the government who called for an end to hostilities, an IGAD-mediated resolution in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia under U.S.-led international pressure was finally agreed at the end of September 2014 that would institute federalisation in the country, a move that even less involved regional leaders in the country had suggested but the government had initially rejected. The talks were led by Nhial Deng Nhial and Deng Alor for the government and rebels, respectively. The rebels’ lead negotiator was then due to be replaced by Taban Deng Gai. At the same time, the government expressed optimism at the resolution.

Both sides then agreed to the government’s 30-month proposal for rule by a national unity government but discussions continued over the authority of the prime minister in the interim period. While the interim period was agreed, the pre-transitional period was still in dispute with the government wanting three months and the rebels asking for a month. SPLM-IO’s Taban Deng said the negotiations were suspended, while the government’s Michael Makuei confirmed this adding that it would resume on 16 October with the prime ministerial issue being referred to an IGAD heads of state summit for discussion. Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin criticized the rebels for allegedly not signing the protocol but also said of the break:

What has happened is that the negotiators have been asked to go back to their principals to consult on some of the issues where there is some concurrence. Some people seemed to agree on certain points. So they have to go back and consult with the principals. The interim government will be formed once you have a political solution. There must be a political agreement so that you have an
interim government to implement what has been agreed upon, in principle that has been accepted by the government."

It also followed IGAD giving the groups 45 days from August to work out a transition agreement. Fund for Peace Report, 2019 has reported that the fighting continued in end-October 2012 Unity with expectations for fighting in Upper Nile, with both sides blaming each other, *The Guardian* claiming preparations were being undertaken for further fighting. At fighting near the compound of the United Nations, Juba, dozens of civilians were reported injured by UNMISS.

In mid-November, despite an agreement to unconditionally end the fighting, hostilities took place in three provinces with each side blaming each other. Matthaw, L (2012) has further that the government rejected a proposal to abolish the post of vice president and replace it with a prime minister. Cabinet Affairs Minister Martin Elia Lomuro said: "The government delegation did not receive such proposal from IGAD. We only read it from the media reports attributing statements carrying such suggestions to the rebels, and I don’t I understand the basis of the proposal."

*Inter Governmental Authority on Development and the issue Resolution of Political Crisis*

The resolution, as announced by IGAD, entailed structures and functions of a transitional national unity government that was "mostly agreed on." However, the "principle" breakthrough after months of discussions on instituting a federalized structure of government was held up by the time frame for implementation. The SPLM-IO called for immediate implementation, while the governing SPLM-Juba asked for a 30-month transitional period prior to the formation of a new administration. This has entail bypassing the scheduled 2015 election.

In December 2013, a political power struggle broke out between President Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar, as the president accused Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état. Fighting broke out, igniting the South Sudanese Civil War. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. The United Nations has peacekeepers in the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Numerous ceasefires were mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and SPLM – in opposition and were subsequently broken. A peace agreement was signed in Ethiopia under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides in August 2015. Machar returned to Juba in 2016 and was
appointed vice president. Following a second breakout of violence in Juba, Machar was replaced as vice-president and he fled the country as the conflict erupted again. Rebel in-fighting has become a major part of the conflict. Rivalries among Dinka factions led by the President and Malong Awan have also led to fighting. In August 2018, another power sharing agreement came into effect (Kulish, 2018). According to Salva, K (2018) has cited that about 400,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the war, including notable atrocities such as the 2014 Bentiu massacre. Although both men have supporters from across South Sudan’s ethnic divides, subsequent fighting has been communal, with rebels targeting members of Kiir’s Dinka ethnic group and government soldiers attacking Nuers. More than 4 million people have been displaced, with about 1.8 million of those internally displaced and about 2.5 million having fled to neighboring countries, especially Uganda and Sudan.

**Southern Sudan Constitution**

The *Transitional Constitution of South Sudan* (TCSS) was drafted in 2011 as a temporary document in place of a permanent constitution. Richrad C, (2010) has cited that it is the current constitution of South Sudan until a permanent constitution can be ratified. Because of the transitional nature of the TCSS, it favors a decentralized governmental system. Prior to the 2011 independence referendum, the Interim Constitution of South Sudan was the constitution of the then-autonomous Southern Sudan. The *National Legislature of South Sudan*, the country’s legislative body, is composed of the National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States.

The executive branch of government is headed by the president. Under the TCSS, the president’s term can last two consecutive 5-year terms. However on April 2015, South Sudan’s parliament voted to extend Kiir’s term to 9 July 2018. A new vote held in July 2018 further postponed *South Sudan’s first election* until 2021. The president has vast powers in creating and dissolving state powers during times of emergency. Kiir demonstrated this power in the dismissal of his entire cabinet in 2013.

**Southern Sudan Economy**

The economy of South Sudan is one of the world’s most underdeveloped with South Sudan having little existing infrastructure and the highest maternal mortality and female illiteracy rates in the world as of 2011. Dipiazza, F (2006) has pointed that South Sudan exports timber to the international market. The
region also contains many natural resources such as petroleum, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, diamonds, hardwoods, limestone and hydropower. The country's economy, as in many other developing countries, is heavily dependent on agriculture. Other than natural resources-based companies, other such organizations include Southern Sudan Beverages Limited, a subsidiary of SABMiller.

**Oil Explorations in Southern Sudan**
The oilfields in the south have been significant to the economy since the latter part of the 20th century. South Sudan has the third-largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, after South Sudan became an independent nation in July 2011, southern and northern negotiators were not immediately able to reach an agreement on how to split the revenue from these southern oilfields.

**Oil and gas concessions in Sudan – 2004**
It is estimated that South Sudan has around 4 times the oil deposits of Sudan. The oil revenues, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), were split equally for the duration of the agreement period. Gettleman, J (2017) has cited that since South Sudan relies on pipelines, refineries, and Port Sudan’s facilities in Red Sea state in Sudan, the agreement stated that the government of Sudan in Khartoum would receive a 50% share of all oil revenues. This arrangement was maintained during the second period of autonomy from 2005 to 2011. In the run up to independence, northern negotiators reportedly pressed for a deal maintaining the 50–50 split of oil revenues, while the South Sudanese were holding out for more favorable terms. Oil revenues constitute more than 98% of the government of South Sudan’s budget according to the southern government’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and this has amounted to more than $8 billion in revenue since the signing of the peace agreement.

After independence, South Sudan objected to Sudan charging US$34 per barrel to transport oil through the pipeline to the oil terminal at Port Sudan. With production of around 30,000 barrels per day, this was costing over a million dollars per day. In January 2012, South Sudan suspended oil production, causing a dramatic reduction in revenue and food costs to rise by 120%. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is a major investor in South Sudan’s oil sector. South Sudan’s economy is under pressure to diversify away from oil as oil reserves will likely halve by 2020 if no new finds are made, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Rebecca, 2012)
Southern Sudan Debt

In terms of South Sudan's external debt, Sudan and South Sudan maintain a shared debt of approximately US$38 billion, all of which has accumulated throughout the past five decades. Though a small portion of this debt is owed to such international institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (approximately US$5.3 billion according to a 2009 report provided by the Bank of Sudan), the bulk of its debt load is actually owed to numerous foreign actors that have provided the nation with financial loans, including the Paris Club (over US$11 billion) and also non-Paris Club bilateral creditors (over US$13 billion).

The Paris Club refers to an informal group of financial officials from 19 of the world's most influential economies, including such member nations as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Canada, while non-Paris Club bilateral creditors refers to any entity that does not enjoy permanent/associated status as a Paris Club member. Private bilateral creditors (i.e. private commercial banks and private credit suppliers) account for the majority of the remainder (approximately US$6 billion of the total debt) (Badawi, 2012).

East African Community

The presidents of Kenya and Rwanda invited the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan to apply for membership upon the independence of South Sudan in 2011, and South Sudan was reportedly an applicant country as of mid-July 2011. Analysts suggested that South Sudan's early efforts to integrate infrastructure, including rail links and oil pipelines, with systems in Kenya and Uganda indicated intention on the part of Juba to pivot away from dependence on Sudan and toward the EAC. Reuters considered South Sudan the likeliest candidate for EAC expansion in the short term, and an article in Tanzanian daily The Citizen that reported East African Legislative Assembly Speaker Abdirahin Haithar Abdi said South Sudan was "free to join the EAC" asserted that analysts believe the country will soon become a full member of the regional body. (Ahmed, 2008)

On 17 September 2011, the Daily Nation quoted a South Sudanese MP as saying that while his government was eager to join the EAC, it would likely delay its membership over concerns that its economy was not sufficiently developed to compete with EAC member states and could become a "dumping ground" for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan exports. This was contradicted by President Salva Kiir, who announced South Sudan had officially embarked on the application process one month later. The application was initially deferred by the
EAC in December 2012, however incidents with Ugandan *boda-boda* operators in South Sudan have created political tension and may delay the process (Amos, 2011)

In December 2012, Tanzania officially agreed to South Sudan’s bid to join the EAC, clearing the way for the world's newest state to become the regional bloc's sixth member. In May 2013 The EAC set aside $82,000 for the admission of South Sudan into the bloc even though admission may not happen until 2016. The process, to start after the EAC Council of Ministers meeting in August 2013, was projected to take at least four years. At the 14th Ordinary Summit held in Nairobi in 2012, EAC heads of state approved the verification report that was presented by the Council of Ministers, then directed it to start the negotiation process with South Sudan. [206]

A team was formed to assess South Sudan’s bid; however, in April 2014, the nation requested a delay in the admissions process, presumably due to South Sudanese Civil War.

South Sudan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, claimed publicly in October 2015 that, following evaluations and meetings of a special technical committee in May, June, August, September and October, the committee has recommended that South Sudan be allowed to join the East African Community. Those recommendations, however, had not been officially released to the public. It was reported that South Sudan could be admitted as early as November 2015 when the heads of East African States had their summit meeting. South Sudan was eventually approved for membership in East African Community in March 2016, and formally acceded with the signature of the treaty in April 2016.

**Humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan**

South Sudan is acknowledged to have some of the worst health indicators in the world. Mosynski, P (2005) has pointed that the under-five *infant mortality* rate is 135.3 per 1,000, whilst *maternal mortality* is the highest in the world at 2,053.9 per 100,000 live births. In 2004, there were only three surgeons serving in southern Sudan, with three proper hospitals, and in some areas there was just one doctor for every 500,000 people.

The epidemiology of *HIV/AIDS* in the South Sudan is poorly documented but the prevalence is believed around 3.1%. According to a 2013 study, South Sudan "probably has the highest *malaria* burden in sub-Saharan Africa". South Sudan is one of the few countries where *dracunculiasis* still occurs. At the time of the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* of 2005, humanitarian needs in Southern
Sudan were massive. However, humanitarian organizations under the leadership of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) managed to ensure sufficient funding to bring relief to the local populations. Along with recovery and development aid, humanitarian projects were included in the 2007 Work Plan of the United Nations and partners. More than 90% of the population of South Sudan live on less than $1 a day, despite the GDP per capita of the entirety of Sudan being $1200 ($3.29/day).

In 2007, the United Nations OCHA (under the leadership of Élaine Duthoit) decreased its involvement in Southern Sudan, as humanitarian needs gradually diminished, slowly but markedly turning over control to the recovery and development activities of NGOs and community-based organizations. Famine reportedly led to deaths in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap states in mid-2011, though the state governments of both denied hunger there was severe enough to cause fatalities.

In Pibor County located in the Jonglei State, in December 2011 and January 2012, cattle raids led to border clashes that eventually resulted in widespread ethnic violence, with thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of South Sudanese being displaced, and hundreds of Médecins Sans Frontières staff went missing. The government declared the area a disaster zone and took control from local authorities. South Sudan has a very high rate of child marriage. Violence against women is common in the country, and South Sudan's laws and policies have been criticized as inadequate in offering protection.

**Water crisis**

The water supply in South Sudan is faced with numerous challenges. Although the White Nile runs through the country, water is scarce during the dry season in areas that are not located on the river. About half the population does not have access to an improved water source, defined as a protected well, standpipe or a handpump within 1 km. The few existing piped water supply systems are often not well maintained and the water they provide is often not safe to drink. Displaced people returning home put a huge strain on infrastructure, and the government institutions in charge of the sector are weak. Substantial external funding from numerous government agencies and non-governmental organizations is available to improve water supply.

Numerous non-governmental organizations support water supply in Southern Sudan, such as Water is Basic, Water for South Sudan, the Obakki Foundation and Bridgton-Lake Region Rotary Club from North America.
Jamam refugee camp
As of February 2014, South Sudan was host to over 230,000 refugees, with the vast majority, over 209,000, having arrived recently from Sudan, because of the War in Darfur. Other African countries that contribute the most refugees to South Sudan are the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to Rotary Clubs Report of (2013) has cited that as a result of the war that erupted in December 2013, more than 2.3 million people – one in every five people in South Sudan – have been forced to flee their homes, including 1.66 million internally displaced people (with 53.4 per cent estimated to be children) and nearly 644,900 refugees in neighbouring countries. Some 185,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) have sought refuge in UN Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, while around 90 per cent of IDPs are on the run or sheltering outside PoC sites. Consequently, UNHCR is stepping up its response through an inter-agency collaborative approach under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, and working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In early February 2013, UNHCR started distributing relief items outside the UN base in Malakal, South Sudan, which was expected to reach 10,000 people.

2017 famine
On 20 February 2017 South Sudan and the United Nations declared a famine in parts of former Unity State, with the warning that it could spread rapidly without further action. Over 100,000 people were affected. The UN World Food Programme said that 40% of the population of South Sudan, 4.9 million people, need food urgently. U.N. officials said that President Salva Kiir Mayardit was blocking food deliveries to some areas. Furthermore, UNICEF warned that more than 1 million children in South Sudan were subjected to malnutrition (UNHCR, 2014)

Analysis: Political dimensions of the South Sudan crisis
The now-defunct Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly ratified a transitional constitution shortly before independence on 9 July 2011. The constitution was signed by the President of South Sudan on Independence Day and thereby came into force. It is now the supreme law of the land, superseding the Interim Constitution of 2005. The constitution establishes a presidential system of government headed by a president who is head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It also establishes the National Legislature comprising two houses: a directly elected assembly, the National
Legislative Assembly, and a second chamber of representatives of the states, the Council of States. (BBC, News 2014)

John Garang, the founder of the SPLA/M, was the first president of the autonomous government until his death on 30 July 2005. Salva Kiir Mayardit, his deputy, was sworn in as First Vice President of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan on 11 August 2005. Riek Machar replaced him as Vice-President of the Government. Legislative power is vested in the government and the bicameral National Legislature. The constitution also provides for an independent judiciary, the highest organ being the Supreme Court.

**National capital project**

The capital of South Sudan is located at Juba, which is also the state capital of Central Equatoria and the county seat of the eponymous Juba County, and is the country’s largest city. However, due to Juba’s poor infrastructure and massive urban growth, as well as its lack of centrality within South Sudan, the South Sudanese Government adopted a resolution in February 2011 to study the creation of a new planned city to serve as the seat of government. It is planned that the capital city will be changed to the more centrally located Ramciel. According to BBC News (2014) this proposal is functionally similar to construction projects in Abuja, Nigeria; Brasilia, Brazil; and Canberra, Australia; among other modern-era planned national capitals. It is unclear how the government will fund the project.

In September 2011, a spokesman for the government said the country’s political leaders had accepted a proposal to build a new capital at Ramciel, a place in Lakes state near the borders with Central Equatoria and Jonglei. Ramciel is considered to be the geographical center of the country, and the late pro-independence leader John Garang allegedly had plans to relocate the capital there before his death in 2005. The proposal was supported by the Lakes state government and at least one Ramciel tribal chief. The design, planning, and construction of the city will likely take as many as five years, government ministers said, and the move of national institutions to the new capital will be implemented in stages.

The civil war that exploded across South Sudan at the end of 2013 is about more than just who will rule the country. It marks the culmination of a years-long silent crisis in the ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a crisis now so deep that the conflict will also determine whether the party will survive at all as a viable political organization and ideology.
'Peace dividends’ – the perks of governance – helped mask differences within the party from the death of John Garang in 2005 until independence in 2011, as SPLM ruled largely unchallenged over the semi-autonomous south. After independence, intra-party differences continued to be set aside in order to face the numerous internal and external threats of the period of 2011-2012, in particular the oil shutdown and cross-border military crisis precipitated in large part by the uprising of the party’s own northern adherents, SPLM-North, in the Kordofan and Blue Nile territories. Yet by April 2013, one year after the border war that resulted in the destruction of the Heglig oil facilities, South Sudan’s oil was again flowing, and that same month the mask of unity was immediately thrown aside: the president decreed his deputy stripped of delegated powers, and three months later removed him altogether. The ousted vice president, also the deputy party chairman, sought together with his allies in the Political Bureau and National Liberation Council to prepare his candidacy for the chairmanship at an upcoming national party convention. As explained below, however, these key party organs had atrophied long before the latest crisis even began. If not their legitimacy, they had certainly lost their vitality. This article seeks to bring light to aspects of the intra-party struggle. Though the focus here is on political matters, a word is first said on the already much discussed question of whether the South Sudan conflict is ‘political’ or ‘ethnic.’

‘Political not ethnic’
The crisis, first of all, cannot be reduced to ‘tribal war,’ as has been repeatedly stressed elsewhere. But it is equally wrong to say simply that the violence is ‘political, not ethnic’: the two in fact cannot be disentangled – ethnicity is itself, in part, a political construct, and conversely, political constituencies are mobilized largely along ethnic lines. Granted, no single ethnicity is mobilized universally against another, key individuals or even entire constituencies may sit on the opposite side from the rest of their tribesmen, but that is not to say that the factor of ethnicity is irrelevant. Nor is ‘Western media’ to be blamed for introducing the idea of tribalism as a prime driver in the conflict (e.g., as one New York Times contributor would have it, citing ‘simplistic Western narratives’ as an obstacle to conflict resolution). South Sudanese government officials themselves decry the power of tribalism, and in the opening days of the war they pointed repeatedly to the alleged
incitement of one or two tribes against the more than 60 others. Nor do officials shy away from ethnic identifiers and ethnic considerations in their political discourse, press statements, and internal deliberations. In sum, ethnicity in South Sudan is a pervasive part of life, society and politics – it is in the names of the people, in their languages, in their homes and origins, and more often than not slashed across their foreheads too.

Acknowledging the role of ethnic hatred in the events of the last two months may be discomfiting for outside observers, especially in the West where moral pretensions would be challenged by an admission of such a calamity, yet facing this reality is an even harder task for South Sudanese, not least because of the scale and shocking extremity of the crimes that have been committed. It is nonetheless something South Sudanese will have to come to terms with if ever reconciliation is to take place. In fact, part of the reason why an authentic national reconciliation process never took place after the 2005 peace was that the danger was too great that the revelations and retellings involved would prove too great a trauma for the already fragile political and social system to sustain.

**SPLM National Liberation Council**

Perhaps the most common political analysis of the present South Sudan conflict is that it is a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his erstwhile vice president, Riek Machar. Though not *per se* inaccurate, this analysis is itself a reduction, overlooking constitutional and governance factors that helped lead to the crisis, which will not be addressed here, as well as broader questions of political culture and political development within the ruling party SPLM, which is the focus of this article.

As a brief primer for those who might be unfamiliar with the SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army), the movement’s lionized founder was John Garang, an officer of the Sudanese army who helped lead the Bor mutiny and crossed with defected troops into western Ethiopia, from where he organized a rebellion in South Sudan – and later the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile and Darfur – together with other key founding members such as Salva Kiir Mayardit, then a military intelligence officer in the Sudanese army.

From 1983-1991, Garang maintained a close alliance with the Ethiopian Derg regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was motivated to destabilize the Sudanese government because it backed Eritrean separatists. The SPLM/A relied on the Ethiopian government for weapons, training, rear bases, as well as key strategic initiatives such as Radio SPLA. In turn, they adopted also the political idiom and ideology of the Derg.
A number of observers have described SPLM/A’s adoption of Ethiopian Marxist rhetoric as merely tactical, much as the party’s unionism was said to be in part merely a concession to its patron Mengistu who was then battling Eritrean separatism. This analysis ignores the obvious influence of Ethiopian Marxism on the formal structure of the party, as well as its less studied influence on political culture, leadership styles and tactics.

Ethiopia’s Derg, which means ‘Committee’ in the Ge’ez language, was backed by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Warsaw Bloc countries in the 1970s and 1980s and was perhaps the best armed government in Africa. Given SPLM/A’s proximity to Ethiopia and its need for backers at the time of its founding, it is not surprising that the movement developed certain affinities to the ruling party there.

SPLM historical documents, for example, explicitly describe the National Liberation Council and National Executive Council as the ‘central’ (and legislative) and ‘executive’ committees of the SPLM, respectively. As the Ethiopian Worker’s Party Political Bureau was nominally accountable to its Central Committee, and the Soviet Politburo likewise accountable to the largely symbolic Central Committee, so too was the SPLM executive organ (NEC) accountable to its central committee (NLC).

**SPLM National Convention**

In all three political parties, a yet more titular role was played by the party congresses, which were meant to elect the central committees. In the SPLM 2008 constitution, the NLC is defined as ‘the second highest organ of the Party,’ with the National Convention being the highest organ, in much the same way as the Soviet Central Committee was accountable to and elected by the party Congress. In harmony with this political tradition, John Garang famously declared at the Chukudum Convention in 1994, “This convention is sovereign,” acknowledging the supremacy of the convention in representing the proletariat, or, in Garangist terms, the marginalized peoples of the New Sudan.

Just how abstract and impractical was this political arrangement is demonstrated by the fact that this first SPLM/A convention was held only ten years after the foundation of the movement, with the next one in Juba not until 14 years later, in 2008. Practically, in the absence of regular conventions and NLC meetings, the chairman and the other executives controlled the affairs of the movement, its direction and policies, with little space for deliberation or oversight.

For many such officials engaged in the day-to-day affairs of the movement, and later in the state itself, there has always been a certain undercurrent of disdain for the window dressing of conventions, councils and elections. This has to do
with the origins and development of the movement: As in Ethiopia, these deliberative organs developed only later in the history of the movement, and not at the outset, when the revolution was first launched at the initiative of officers of the existing regime.

Nonetheless, even in 2013 enormous symbolic significance was still attached to the Convention, and its delay (it was meant to be held five years after the May 2008 Convention) had a major impact. Kiir, in his capacity as SPLM chairman, appealed to the primacy of the National Convention as justification for his declaration in November that the Politburo and NLC had become defunct organs, saying, "We were supposed to hold a convention in May, this year. Mish yau nihaya bita khamsa sanawaat? (Haven't the five years already come to an end?). Do you think that today the structures still have the legitimacy to continue functioning? No, SPLM has dissolved itself alone."

More controversially, the chairman continued saying, "Only office of the chairman is the only one that cannot be dissolved, nobody can dissolve it. And now I have all the powers to set up committees to start reorganization from the grassroots. When we talk about the National Liberation Council, or we talk about the Political Bureau, all these things are outdated."

**Failure of the supreme party organs**

Hence, in the weeks and days before the shooting started on 15 December, the chairman of the party found himself at odds with members of the Political Bureau and Liberation Council, first over the legitimacy of their own positions, and second over the preparations for the upcoming convention.

The group of politicians associated with Riek Machar on 8 December issued a statement saying "the Chairman unconstitutionally dissolved key SPLM organs namely the Political Bureau and the National Liberation Council and the National and States Secretariats on account that their mandates had expired in May 2013."

"He has already instructed the State Governors (instead of the State SPLM Secretariats), to appoint their preferred delegates to the SPLM 3rd National Convention scheduled for February 2014," the statement added. "The intention is to sideline and prevent SPLM historical leaders and cadres categorized as 'potential competitors' from participation in the Convention."

Ominously, the Machar group concluded, "This is a very dangerous move and is likely to plunge the party and the country into the abyss." From the office of the Deputy Chairman, the response by a group of pro-Kiir political bureau and NLC
members foreshadowed later developments. It declared as ‘rebellion’ the expression of public dissent, questioning why they would be “addressing the public on the eve of a meeting of the National Liberation Council, the highest organ of the party between Conventions, instead of doing so in that official gathering.”

In a sign that a deep party breach had already come, the Kiir group further inferred that the politicians who had made the press statement were no longer members – or, certainly, no longer worthy of being members – of the Political Bureau or National Liberation Council, owing to their violation of ‘organizational discipline.’ Taking dissent to the press and to the public, it should be noted, was no normal political move. It ran counter to the culture of discretion and deliberate lack of transparency that SPLM/A veterans learnt through the war years in Sudan and from the Leninist methods of the Derg. For the party loyalists supporting Kiir, Machar’s move was deeply offensive, threatening to bring matters that were rightly the concern only of veteran party cadres into the public view.

Disagreements over the selection of delegates, the timing and leadership of the organizing of the convention therefore helped precipitate the crisis that broke on 15 December. Party leaders found that the two nominally highest organs of the party, the NLC and Convention, had atrophied to such an extent that they could not even be convened without crisis, let alone proceed to deliberations of party business. In the end, all pretense as to the primacy of these high consultative organs of the party was lost, marking the start of the open and violent power struggle that continues today.

**Executive prerogative**

At the heart of this crisis is also disagreement as to the extent of the powers of the SPLM Chairman, who is also President of the Republic. Though none of the constitutional or legal questions will be addressed here directly, the point here is that the question of executive prerogative is a significant dimension of the present South Sudan crisis.

In his speech at Freedom Hall on 15 February, 2012 President Salva Kiir explained the historic role of the chairman in the party: “Our position was that leadership must be centered in one person. And we chose our leader. That was Dr. John Garang. Now when John was the chairman of the SPLM and was the commander-in-chief of the army, orders were one always. He will give orders, and orders would be implemented immediately. That was how we prosecuted the war.”
Kiir was describing the authority granted to the party chairman according to the SPLM/A practices and structures. Documents such as the resolutions of the first SPLM/A National Convention at Chukudum in 1994 provide the chairman of the movement with executive and even legislative powers, allowing him to pass orders “which shall have the force of law” and which only subsequently would be confirmed by other organs of the party. The chairman also appointed the chief justice, and though he had no other explicit judicial powers, as commander-in-chief he was involved in the exercise of military justice. Not only the chairman but also his representatives in the states, commanders, and other officers of the movement enjoyed considerable executive prerogative.

Drafters of the South Sudanese constitution included provisions that attempted to accommodate this aspect of the political culture, for example endowing the president with the constitutional authority to remove his vice president and entire cabinet – a prerogative he exercised in July last year – or to appoint caretaker governors, remove governors in case of emergency, etc. But by its very nature, executive prerogative defies restraint by law. The executive is not meant to break the law, but he is to act in situations that are not provided for by the law. And since South Sudan is a society in which much law is not widely known or universally applied, and where some critical matters have yet to be legislated upon at all, this gives executives considerably more power than elsewhere might be provided for by the letter.

Compounding this dynamic is the factor mentioned already briefly above, which is that the party cadres, and the chairman in particular, are meant to be inscrutable to a certain degree. Their decrees, for instance, are generally issued without explanation and with little or no discussion, and their movements, plans and projects are generally shared with few.

In any case, executive prerogative is not only a feature of the ruling party, but also one of the society at large. As any familiar with the country are aware, the zul kabir (‘big man’) at any function is given deference, and in any organization or office typically afforded much discretion in terms of his decision-making powers. At this stage, the most obvious political question to most South Sudanese is which ‘zul kabir’ they want to be president – Kiir, Machar, or neither. Locally, this question is playing out in contests for positions such as governor or commissioner as well. The stage play over who becomes ‘big man’, however, should not obscure also the questions as to what the position of ‘big man’ also means, and whether limitations are placed on such positions or not.

**Exaggeration of Western influence**

Western countries such as Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States – sometimes referred to as the ‘Troika’ owing to their joint coordination of Sudan
policy – are often credited for their leadership role in the CPA mediation and later in the September accords that ended the post-independence oil crisis between Khartoum and Juba.

In spite of their strategic impact in this regard, the interventions by the Troika in fact influenced the political development of South Sudan comparatively little. Rather, the key formative and transitional political experiences of the SPLM/A leaders were in Mengistu’s Ethiopia, as already described, and in Khartoum, both under Nimeiri as members of the regional and national governments and military, and later under Bashir as members of the Unity Government during the pre-independence CPA period.

The later patronage of Western backers, in particular the United States, helped change the strategic situation but not, in the end, the political culture of SPLM/A. Nor did it forge the kind of deep and enduring economic and cultural ties that the South shares with Sudan in particular. And for all their CPA-era flattery of US, the older members of SPLM/A probably will never forget that for years the Carter and Reagan Administrations backed successive Khartoum governments, in a bid to counter Soviet influence in Libya and Ethiopia, during the very same years that the movement was working closely with the Ethiopians.

Even during the post-9/11 US surge in the region under the George W. Bush Administration, which featured US backing for the CPA process and later overt defense cooperation, the SPLM/A leadership generally understood that this was done more out of hostility to militant political Islam in the Sudan rather than because of any political affinity to the movement.

The influence of Western backers in the political development of the SPLM/A was thus never as profound as that of the Ethiopian and Sudanese regimes themselves. Of course, the influence of the former was not entirely negligible – key leaders lived and studied in the US, UK or elsewhere, for instance, including John Garang and Riek Machar. Moreover, donor-backed governance projects and technical advisors conceptually and practically influenced developments in legislation, law enforcement, military organization, education and other sectors, especially since the end of the last civil war in 2005.

Yet it seems that these limitations were misunderstood in Washington, where the sychophantic press had lauded the United States government for ‘midwifing’ South Sudan to independence, exaggerating the American role in the decades-long independence struggle. Hence in Washington, from the outset of the crisis in December it was wrongly assumed that American power might influence a peaceful solution. As quoted in The New York Times, a White House foreign policy
official said in early January, "None of us is naïve; this is a real and profound crisis. But we’ve got a long history, and we’ve got some leverage."

In fact, there was no leverage. Nor was SPLM/A ever ‘midwifed’ by anyone; it has never fully come to trust the West, it remains in uneasy brotherhood with the Sudan’s NCP, and its isolation and paranoia are only growing. This is a party that is more accurately described as the orphaned child of the Derg, the regime whose collapse in 1991 sent the party into military catastrophe, made all the worse by the near simultaneous betrayal of the SPLA-Nasir faction then led by Riek Machar.

**Momentum of the crisis**

The country is now reliving the trauma of that crisis. The political structures, political culture and political idiom borrowed from the Derg regime during the first years of the SPLM/A rebellion were never formally renounced, not even after the Ethiopian regime's collapse, nor were alternatives actively sought and endorsed, though Sudanese, Western and indigenous political influences in part filled the void.

Remarkably, instead, the foundational revolutionary myths adopted in Ethiopia were preserved and political development within the SPLM/A continued along the same lines at the Chukudum National Convention in 1994. The same were reiterated at the second national convention in Juba in 2008, albeit with less conviction, and were being rehearsed yet again with significant confusion and cynicism, in the months and days prior to the crisis started 15 December.

This ongoing crisis has vastly eroded public trust in South Sudan’s ruling party, now divided and yet again at war. Events of the crisis increasingly have their own momentum and generally defy political logic: the capture of Leer, the continued detention of the four ‘coup plotters,’ the brutalities just committed in Malakal.

With the humanitarian crisis deepening and the economy on the brink, the failure of the political order becomes increasingly impossible to deny. At this stage not only is there little left of civil society, but indeed great danger to civil authority, civil order, justice and law more broadly. In some areas indeed these have already vanished entirely, and there we have seen atrocities.

In such circumstances, whatever remains of genuine political process, of civil society, of responsible governance of any kind, of youth and women and church voices, remain significant, less because they can control the course of events now than that they may be the only ones left picking up the pieces when this is all over.
Conclusion
Since independence of Southern Sudan relations with Northern Sudan have been changing. Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir first announced, in January 2011, that dual citizenship in the North and the South would be allowed, but upon the independence of South Sudan he retracted the offer. He has also suggested an EU-style confederation. Essam Sharaf, Prime Minister of Egypt after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, made his first foreign visit to Khartoum and Juba in the lead-up to South Sudan’s secession. Israel quickly recognized South Sudan as an independent country, and is host to thousands of refugees from South Sudan, who now face deportation to their native country. According to American sources, former President Obama officially recognized the new state after Sudan (now North Sudan). Egypt, Sudan, Germany and Kenya were among the first to recognize the country's independence on 8 July 2011. Several states that participated in the international negotiations concluded with a self-determination referendum were also quick to acknowledge the overwhelming result. The Rationalist process included Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Eritrea, the United Kingdom and Norway.

South Sudan is a member state of the United Nations, the African Union, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. South Sudan plans to join the Commonwealth of Nations, the East African Community, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Some international trade organizations categorize South Sudan as part of the Greater Horn of Africa. Full membership in the Arab League has been assured, should the country's government choose to seek it, though it could also opt for observer status. It was admitted to UNESCO on 3 November 2011. On 25 November 2011, it officially joined the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional grouping of East African states.

The United States supported the 2011 referendum on South Sudan’s independence. The New York Times reported that "South Sudan is in many ways an American creation, carved out of war-torn Sudan in a referendum largely orchestrated by the United States, its fragile institutions nurtured with billions of dollars in American aid." The U.S. government’s long-standing sanctions against Sudan were officially removed from applicability to newly independent South Sudan in December 2011, and senior RSS officials participated in a high-level international engagement conference in Washington, D.C., to help connect foreign investors with the RSS and South Sudanese private sector representatives. Given the interdependence between some sectors of the economy of the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, certain activities still require OFAC
authorization. Absent a license, current Sudanese sanction regulations will continue to prohibit U.S. persons from dealing in property and interests that benefit Sudan or the Government of Sudan. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report, "The Republic of South Sudan: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa’s Newest Country", identifies outstanding political and humanitarian issues as the country forges its future.

**Recommendations**

The paper has the following recommendations for peace to be sustained and promoted in Southern Sudan in particular and Africa in general:

i. Leaders in Africa must consider the National spirit and unity rather than ethnic affiliation to promote the national conscious and development.

ii. Politicians in Africa must have a clear defined goal that would promote the conduct of good governance operation

iii. Democracy in Africa must be build based on principles and philosophy of serving the core values of humanity

iv. Resolving crisis must be address through all peaceful means through Peaceful negotiation and reasonable diplomacy.

**References**


