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**RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE ISSUE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA**

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***ABSTRACT***

*The conflict in Rwanda has covers period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psycho-logically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neigh-boring countries and many of these peoples has become internally displaced within Rwanda and other neighboring countries. The agony and legacy of the violence has created suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region during that time. For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and it provided substantial assistance to alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is estimated to have cost in to amount of US\$1.4 billion, of which about one third was spent in Rwanda and two-thirds in asylum countries. The consequences of Rwanda conflict or violence has led to typically to the breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies. The paper has the major findings that Rwanda's conflict led to massive killing of hundred innocent citizens, secondly, media has become a tools for escalating violence during the Rwanda's conflict, lastly the ethnicity syndrome become a significant for disintegrating the major groups of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. The paper has recommended that African countries must employed priority to the Statehood than the considerations of*

*ethnic affiliations and government at all level must provide measures for peaceful sustenance in the society rather than encouraging violence in the society.*

**Keywords:** *Conflict, Violence, Media, Peaceful living, Massive Killing.*

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## **Introduction**

Conflict in Africa has become widespread as result of power mongering, religious or ethnic differences. However in Rwanda, the 1994 genocide was such a vituperative form of conflict that scarred ethnic relations broke trust, exacerbated hatreds and promoted the intergenerational transmission of trauma. Deep fear, distrust, depression, and sense of hopelessness can last long after the conflict is supposedly resolved. Endogenous approaches to conflict resolution are methods that are rooted in the culture and tradition of a community. These mechanisms of conflict resolution emerge from a complex set of knowledge and technologies that were developed around specific conditions effecting particular populations and communities indigenous to a particular geographic area. In Looking at Africa, Zartman (2000:7) asserts that conflict resolution mechanisms can only be labeled as endogenous if “*they have been practiced for an extended period and have evolved within African societies rather than being the product of external importation.*” Endogenous conflict resolution methods are unique, informal, communal, restorative, spiritual, context-specific and diverse, apart from being integrated into life experiences. Furthermore, the use of endogenous methods of conflict resolution reflects the centrality of the community from which the fundamental needs of members are satisfied. Endogenous methods of conflict resolution are based on the premise that,

*“ Understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural knowledge of a person and the culture.”*

Here, we can understand that the conflict in Rwanda was characterized with ethnic identities that lead to massive killings of hundred thousands of Rwanda’s and others was been displaced or fled out of the country for fear of killings or damage of their properties. This give us a light that ethnic factor become a source of generating conflict or violence in various African communities.

## **Conceptual Framework**

### **The overwhelming reality of the genocide in Rwanda**

The planned, deliberate effort to eliminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda that culminated in the massive slaughter of April-December 1994, has been define the

concept of genocide articulated in the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 ( UN Convention Protocol , 1948).

In this evaluation, the overwhelming reality of the genocide has become clear in ways that had not been envisaged at the outset. As a result, the approach of a traditional evaluation with emphasis on impact, efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis was not always appropriate or sufficient, but had to be supplemented with qualitative analysis of cause-and-effect assessed in relation to contractual obligations or international legal norms. Similarly, the documentary research and, especially, the interviews and fieldwork, repeatedly demonstrated how the genocide, its victims and its perpetrators, shaped the prospects for rehabilitation and recovery, probably for decades to come.

A basic premise of the evaluation was that it has yield applicable lessons for the international community, both in responding to emergencies and helping to rebuild societies. Despite the unique character of the Rwanda experience, it also shares many of the characteristics of other complex emergencies. An evaluation of this experience has therefore been able to frame recommendations that have relevance for complex emergencies of conflict that can be found in Africa.

## **CONFLICT**

Conflict as conceived by Zartman (2009) refers to a violent dispute or an incompatibility of standpoints and perspectives. In the human society, conflicts are ubiquitous and inevitable, as such it can be considered as intrinsic feature of human existence. As such, parties to a conflict can range from individuals, groups, and organizations to sovereign states.

Bercovitch, *et al*, (2009) contends that these kinds of actors are the stakeholders in a conflict as they initiate conflict, pursue and ultimately determine its outcome. The conflict resolution must therefore take cognizance of the various parties to a conflict and identify the needs and desires of each other parties for the process to be successful.

However, the identification of parties to a conflict is not at all a very easy and straightforward task. According to Jeong (2010), one of the major tasks that the third parties to a conflict (people, groups, organization and states) that are trying to resolve a conflict is to appreciate and understand the systems and sub-systems that may be involved in the conflict. Furthermore, some parties to a conflict do operate as autonomous actors while other are under the control of some other bigger and stronger units present within the state or outside the state. Therefore, it is apparent that parties to a conflict refer to a spectrum of actors from the

individual, to the regional, through to the national up to the international agents. It may as well include the third parties that are themselves involved in trying to mitigate a conflict.

With the broad spectrum of the parties to a conflict also comes a conglomeration of issues which precipitate the conflict and which form a crucial dilemma to the third parties. Bercovitch, *et al* (2009) and Galtung (2000) have contended that conflicts are situations in which various parties hold and pursue incompatible or divergent goals, which in turn inspire their violent or irrational behavior. For many conflicts, identifying the precipitating issues presents a major dilemma for the third parties trying to solve it as these issues are not only diverse but are intricately reinforcing. It is not surprising therefore, that it has been determined that parties to a conflict even differ on the issues in a conflict. Haus (2001) contends that getting the parties to agree on what the conflict issues entails presents one of the vital turning points in the successful resolution of a conflict. Generally, according to Kriesberg (2009), several precipitators or issue in conflicts have been identified including; resources, values, beliefs, ethnicity, nature of government, national honor, liberation conflicts, limited territory, national unification and imperialism. Kelman (2010) further points out that issue in conflict can also include; issues of sovereignty, issues of ideology, issues of religion or race as well as issues of survival. Currently, environmental issues have also increasingly gained ground as potential precipitators of conflicts.

Therefore, due to the diversities in the actors and the precipitators of conflict, conflict resolution is a serious undertaking, which involves several actors, the third parties in efforts towards conflict resolution. Third parties often intervene in conflict to deescalate the hostilities and transform the conflict structure. According to Galtung (2000), third party entry into conflict permits the establishment of a different communication pattern. The third party filters and relays back the attitudes, behaviors and messages of the conflicting parties with the aim of deescalating the conflict (Estree, 2009).

However, 'pure' mediators are increasingly having been conventionally considered powerless in determining the outcome of a conflict. It argued that the more potentially successful third parties are those whose entry not only alters the communication structure but hugely impacts on if not altering the existing power balance between and among the parties. The third parties can alter the communication structure and the behaviors of the conflicting parties by effective use of negative and positive incentives (the carrot and stick option). The flipside the entry of a powerful third party is that it can disrupt the power balance and

lead to further de-escalation of the conflict or may find itself become an integral part of the conflict.

Four critical issues are imperative in the third parties' engagement in the resolution and settling of a conflict. According to Galtung (2000), these include prioritization, inclusivity, and the association between the local, national, regional as well as international-level leadership. Prioritization can be conceived as the mediators' decision on issues that need to be settled fast to avert further conflict and loss of life (Wani, 2010). In fact, the mediators are often getting caught up between the need to move the mediation forward or to dawdle it down depending on the underpinning issues of the conflict. Striking a balance between these contending issues is a delicate process, which demands prioritization of what is important contingent on the prevailing circumstances (Väyrynen, 1991). Therefore, the third parties especially the mediators must decide which issues warrant mediating on and settling in the peace agreement and which issues can be pushed forward to the post-agreement period.

According to Prendergast and Smock (1999a), the prioritization of issues is fundamental in determining the success of the conflict resolution process and the establishment of an enduring tranquility and peace that permits addressing of other finer issues. The sequencing of justice issue in conflict and post-conflict situation has a huge bearing on the establishment of enduring peace. The second critical issue is inclusivity, which implies the inclusion of diverse actors in the conflict resolution process. The third parties involved in the conflict resolution process must take account of the various issues of priority as perceived by each party to the conflict. Furthermore, as Jeong (2010) notes while the convention practice of mediation has focused on the conflicting parties, it is increasingly important to include virtually all members of the society in the process.

It is contended that inclusivity establishes a feeling of ownership among the actors of the conflict resolution process and inspires the whole society effectively engage in the efforts aimed at establishing a lasting peace (McGarry & O'Leary, 1993). Recent debates regarding inclusivity in mediation and conflict resolution process have contended that inclusion of larger segments of the society facilitates the identification of issues in conflict and the determination of potentially effective ways of addressing the issues. An inclusive process provides the vital opportunity for various kinds of actors to participate in the process and facilitate the inclusion of various issues of importance to them in the process (Kriesberg, 2009).

Furthermore, inclusivity provides legitimacy to the process in addition to facilitating the inclusion of a wide perspective of issues in the agenda. However,

inclusivity is an intricate undertaking and may take many forms including national and community dialogues that seek to identify a central position. Moreover, inclusivity implies the establishment of linkage among various local, national, regional and international actors (Burton, 2009).

### **The dynamic of the Rwanda's crisis**

The dynamic nature, unpredictability and complexity of the Rwanda crisis raise many difficult - issues for the international community in terms of timing, nature and scale of response. For Rwanda, with almost two million refugees just outside its borders, the crisis is far from over. Most of the field research for this evaluation was conducted in the spring and early summer of 1995. Efforts have been made to update the fieldwork findings through documentary research and long-distance communication. However, as the situation continues to evolve, there is an inescapable tradeoff between timeliness and completeness. There has already been sufficient experience regarding the response of the international community to yield findings with important implications for the future.

### **The range of responses to the Rwanda crisis may be categorized as follows:**

- i. The international community's responses to the civil war and the civil violence that preceded the crisis of April–July 1994;
- ii. the early warning information available to the international community about a likely genocide and reactions to such warnings;
- iii. the international responses to the genocide that started after the April 6, 1994 shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane;
- iv. the international humanitarian assistance to the survivors inside Rwanda and to the huge refugee communities in neighboring countries;
- v. the international assistance to repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, and to recovery and reconstruction of the Rwandese government and society after the upheaval.

The continuation of the crisis has imposed a limitation for the evaluation with respect to this last category. A complete evaluation of the repatriation and rehabilitation experiences of refugees who fled from Rwanda in 1994 has not been possible. Most have resisted repatriation due to intimidation from camp leaders and the perpetrators of genocide, and out of fear of reprisals inside Rwanda. An assessment of the impact of assistance for recovery and

reconstruction has not been possible - because until recently little of the pledged assistance had been committed and disbursed.

A related limitation is incomplete analysis of the important regional context. While account is taken of the recent evolution of the Rwanda crisis and its implications for the surrounding Great Lakes Region, neither the Synthesis nor the four studies have analyzed the situation in Burundi and the other Great Lakes countries sufficiently to provide a definitive assessment. Notwithstanding this deficiency, several of the recommendations set out in Chapter Five are believed to be relevant for the international community response to the current crisis in Burundi and should receive urgent attention.

### **Historical Perspective:**

#### **Some Explanatory Factors**

The purpose of paper is to present a historical background to the developments in contemporary Rwanda that culminated in the genocide beginning in April 1994. The study relies on available written materials supplemented by interviews with established scholars on Rwanda Conflict in Nigerian University in Bayero University and Maitama Sule University, Kano (both Scholar and Diplomat).

The review of this historical background has not led to any easy answers or to pinpoint one or two ultimate reasons for the tragic events. On the contrary, it has rather led to the conclusion that recent events result from accumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a building block for the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting.

However, this summary is used to highlight a few specific developments in Rwanda history that we think have been of decisive importance, and need to be understood in order better to comprehend what led to the tragedy in 1994 and what is going on in Rwanda today. We think that they are all-important and hesitate to stress one more than the other. The scholarly debate on Rwanda has often been “reductionist”, trying to establish whether one or the other factor has been more important – a debate that has helped to clarify the different standpoints, but has led to little conclusive - result. The aspects to be stressed are:

#### **1) The build-up of indigenous social and political structures towards the end of the pre- \_colonial period.**

Looking this in particular under the reign of the Tutsi king Rwabugiri during the second half of the 19th century. Rwabugiri’s administration (1860–1895) imposed a harsh regime on the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu

lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. Rwabugiri amplified feudal labour systems, in particular the uburetwa, i.e. labour in return for access to land, a system that was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers while exempting Tutsi. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an “ethnic” differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European colonialism.

**2) The German colonial (1899–1916) and Belgian trusteeship (1916 to 1961) policy of indirect rule,**

Favoring the strengthening of Tutsi hegemony and resulting in a political and administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi overlords of the Nyiginya clan from the 1920s. Under the influence of the so-called hermitic thesis, this policy culminated in 1933 with the introduction of compulsory identity cards, reinforcing and accelerating the late pre-colonial process towards a separation of Tutsi and Hutu (and Twa). From then on, all Rwandese had to relate to “their” respective ethnic group, which in turn determined avenues and fortunes in society. Under European colonialism, a policy of “ethno-genesis” was actively pursued, i.e. a politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially-constituted categories of the pre-colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority Hutu the have-nots.

**3) The abrupt change by Belgium only some 25 years later.**

The influence of the general decolonization process in Africa, the build-up towards political independence in the Congo (Zaire) and in a belated attempt to redress past injustices – the colonial administration (and the Catholic church) shifted support from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. This eased the way for the so-called peasant, or Hutu, revolution of 1959–61, through which Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsi dominated monarchy to a Hutu led independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic violence. The events of 1959–61 also forced tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighboring countries, from where groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into Rwanda, sowing the seeds of the country’s ethnically-defined refugee problem.

**4) The Rwandese society developed over the centuries into a remarkably organized state, with a high degree of authoritarian social control from the Centre.**

Largely due to extreme population pressure, in addition to complex agricultural production systems and competition for land between crop-farmers and cattle-



owners. This was not only the case with the core Tutsi-dominated pre-colonial feudal kingdom (i.e. excluding the northern and south-western areas of present Rwanda) or in which a vertical chain of command through layers of chiefs regulated the economy and the life of peasants through various social contracts – but also during the German and Belgian administrations, through which a policy of indirect rule continued, and strengthened, the control from above.

What is important in the context of this study is, first, that the highly-organized and centralized Rwandese state formation over the years constrained the scope for the emergence of nongovernmental organizations and independent interest groups. Political parties did appear on the scene towards the end of the 1950s, but on the whole the development of an independent, NGO-based civil society has been largely dwarfed by the state. Thus, along with the oppression and exploitation of Rwandese women farmers – who carry out most of the agricultural work and become physically drained through constant pregnancies – there are, for example, in male-dominated Rwanda only a few associations of rural women to voice their interests.

Second, – and most importantly – the political culture of centralized social control has facilitated policies aiming at mobilization or manipulation of the rural people, for peaceful as well as violent purposes. Subjugated receivers of instructions from above and without means to disobey, the peasant population has largely joined campaigns launched by the government, whether the essentially constructive umuganda labour regime from the mid-70s or the later - fatally destructive interahamwe militias.

5) **Increasing intra-Hutu tensions – mainly between groups from the northern Gisenyi and Ruhengeri regions and those from the rest of the country** – Development during the First and Second Republics (1962–1990) and came to form an important factor underlying the cleavage between Hutu in the 1990s. In addition to competition over political spoils, at the core of this division is the historical fact that the northern Hutu were independent until the first decade of the 20th century, when they were militarily defeated by combined German and Tutsi-led southern Rwandese troops. To this day, the northerners form a distinctive Hutu sub-culture in which the awareness of a pre-Tutsi past is more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda. President Habyarimana's informal council – or akazu; constituted around his wife and brothers in law represented this independent Hutu tradition, deeply suspicious of any reconciliatory gestures towards the exiled Tutsi community and, therefore, also essentially hostile to the Hutu political groups favoring a dialogue with the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The slow and often flawed democratization process in 1990–94 was

to a great extent due to this intra-Hutu division. The akazu was also behind the genocide from April 1994, pre-paring the tragic events through instructions to presidentially appointed (may-ors), building up the militias and mobilizing the Burundian Hutu refugees who poured into southern Rwanda after the assassination of the Burundian Hutu president Ndadaye in October 1993.

6) **The economic slump starting in the late 1980s and the effects of the actions subsequently taken by the government in consultation with the international donor community, i.e.**

The structural adjustment programmes of 1990 and 1992. The economic deterioration, largely due to a sharp decline of world market prices for coffee – Rwanda’s prime export earner – as well as to unfavorable weather and economic policies such as increased protectionism, price controls and other regulations, affected the whole society. In US dollar terms, GDP per capita fell by some 40 percent over the four years 1989–1993. The slump hit the Rwandese peasantry particularly hard. Combined with the effects of the civil war from October 1990, continued demographic pressure on available resources and decreasing agricultural yields, the economic crisis introduced yet another element of stress and instability into the Rwandese political and - social fabric. The international community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, overlooked these potentially explosive social and political consequences when designing and imposing economic conditions for support to Rwandas economic recovery.

7) **The refugee crisis, starting in 1959 and developing into a constant political and social problem throughout the history of independent Rwanda.**

Tens of thousands of Tutsi in several waves from the Hutu revolution onwards were forced into exile in neighboring countries. Largely due to the intransigence of the Rwandese Hutu-led governments regarding their demands to return, and to the unwelcoming policies of some of the host countries, the exiled Tutsi communities became over the years increasingly militant. In turn, this led to the creation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the military attack on Rwanda in October 1990 and the ensuing civil war.

8) **The two-generations-old unsolved issue of impunity for genocidal and other violent crimes in Rwanda is of crucial importance in this context.**

The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1951 and ratified by Rwanda in 1975, stipulates that persons committing genocide shall be punished, “-whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”. In

addition to the crime of genocide as such, punishable acts according to the Convention are conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. In Rwanda, those who over the years have been responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, the crimes must be - addressed. If a culture of impunity is allowed to continue, the spiral of violence seems almostbound to be repeated in the future.

**9) Linked to the problem of impunity is the legacy of fear that exists in the Rwandese social fabric as a result of repeated mass killings since 1959.**

The origins in the process of ethno genesis and division between privileged Tutsi and under-privileged Hutu during the colonial period. With the creation of the ethnicity issue followed a social construct of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, contempt and mistrust, which ultimately permeated the entire society and developed into a culture of fear. It largely contributed to the outburst of violence at the time of Rwanda's independence, when the tables were turned and the fear among the majority Hutu gave way to a fear among the minority Tutsi. Since then, it has been repeatedly exploited for purposes of political manipulation.

**10) Developments in Rwanda are, finally, closely related to developments in the Great Lakes region.**

Looking at some component of Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north-western Tanzania and Burundi. This is the historical region of the Banyarwanda, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, Kinyarwanda, and who throughout modern history share a common heritage. It was violated by European powers, who at the turn of the century divided the region and the people into Belgian, British and German colonial dominions, with far-reaching consequences for later, including the most recent, events. Thus regional political, economic, social and cultural dynamics - taking the form of, among other things, cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, ideas and fears - must be borne in mind when considering solutions to Rwanda's problems, as well as the problems of - above all - Burundi and Zaire. If not, the ghastly events in Rwanda in 1994 could easily draw the entire region into similar, or still greater, human tragedies.

All these factors, sometimes fuelled and sometimes constrained by interventions from the international community, led to the political manipulation of ethnicity in the 1990s, which in turn led to the genocide from 6 April 1994. This study of the history of Rwanda will hopefully help the reader to understand that the causes of polarized ethnicity are not easily defined. On the one hand, the

conclusion should not be drawn that such ethnicity stems only from differences based on ancestry, culture or social position. As shown in the full report of Study I, the complexity of the pre-colonial society was such that differences could just as well be explained by lineage, clan, occupation, class etc. On the other hand, neither can the conclusion be drawn that the contemporary antagonistic cleavages along ethnic lines are attributable solely to specific events during the colonial period, nor in the period thereafter. There are no simple answers. The present can be explained only as a product of a long and conflict-ridden process, in which many factors contribute to the total picture of what happen and become a lesson for some African countries genocide conflict as result of differences of religion or ethnic identities.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The issues of conflict or more precisely intrastate conflict as attracted a lot of scholarly attention (Jeong, 2010). Consequently, several theoretical perspectives have been developed in an attempt to conceptualize intrastate or civil conflicts; among the most perceptible theories of conflict are the Galtung's model of conflict violence and peace, the conflict transformation theory and the escalation de-escalation theory.

Conflict transformation as concept is relatively new relative to other concepts covered by the peace and conflict studies. Conflict transformation theory holds that conflict transpires through four critical stages. According to Vayrynen (1991), the stages of conflict transformation in this sense include actor transformation, issues transformation, rule transformation and structural transformation. Actor transformation implies the internal change in relation to parties to a conflict and the emergence of new actors; issue transformation denotes the alteration in the political agenda and essence of the conflict. Lederach (2000) explains that rule transformation implies the alteration of the norms followed by parties to a conflict in interacting with each other and determines the limits of such relationships. Structural Transformation alludes to the alterations that occur in the system within which the conflicts are experienced. Advocates of the conflict transformation theory contend that modern conflicts demand more than just the identification of win-win upshots and the reframing of positions. The intricacies of the relationships between and among the parties are embedded in the conflict pattern of the relationships and may extend beyond the current site of the conflict. In this sense therefore, conflict transformation can be regarded as dealing with the transformation of the relationships, discourses and were possible the constitution of a society interested in the prolongation of

conflict (Mial, 2013). The conflict transformation theory further contends that the conflict mitigation process should not be left only to the elites. It should rather include individuals belonging to the conflict parties, within the affected region or society as well as outsiders possessing the relevant resources all who perform a potentially crucial role in the long-term peace process (Galtung, 2000).

As such, it is apparent that the conflict transformation theory perceives conflict as a broad process, which incorporates various stakeholders who must play a critical role in ensuring the establishment of an enduring peace. Furthermore, the conflict transformation theory accentuates conflict resolution as a wide-ranging and comprehensive process entailing supporting groups in a conflict context over the mediatory role of outsiders. According to Mial, (2013) conflict transformation also acknowledges that conflict transforms gradually through minute and major changes, as well as through specific steps.

The conflict transformation theory helps account for the Rwandan and Burundian conflicts. The two conflicts present a scenario in which conflict developed within several stages and with actors and issues changing as the conflict developed. The conflict resolution processes in both countries presented the alteration of the rules of interactions between the various conflicting parties in both cases. The resolution mechanisms also resulted in the alteration in the context of the structure or context in which the parties engaged each other.

Another critical theoretical perspective on conflict resolution is the human needs theory, which establishes a framework that emphasized human needs and perceives conflict as emanating from unrealized human needs. The notion that unmet human needs are core precipitant of conflict is widely is a widely accepted perspective in international relational especially with respect to peace and conflict resolution specialism. In both the Rwandan and Burundian cases, the parties particularly the non-state actors were convinced that their respective government had failed to address their needs, including access to power, economic resources and had accentuated and pursued the needs of other Hutu ethnic group (Jean-Pierre, 2003; Phil, 2010; Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008).

The notion that unmet human needs are core precipitant of conflict is perception that is also shared by both Burton and Maslow (in Burton 2009) hold that needs, physiological and psychological as opposed interests leads to conflict as people struggle fulfill their needs. With reference, to Rwanda and Burundi, the unmet needs developed to a need for survival by individuals and groups from the different ethnic groups and established a situation in which conflict was inevitable as each group pursued their interests using whatever means necessary (Uvin, 1999). Shelter, water and food are considered as key human needs within

this theory Burton (2009) however added other needs including identity, security, personal development and recognition to these as potential precipitators of conflict.

Issues of political liberalization, participation and developmental needs occupy a peripheral position within this theory (Ikejiaku&Dauda, 2011). The failure of existing state infrastructure to address these needs is the primary source ethno-nationalist struggles (Burton, 2009). Burton (2009) submits that the human needs theory provides an insight into the field and potential issues of concern in conflict analysis and resolution. Certainly, the needs theory is crucial in understanding the underpinning precipitants of conflict, as well as the resolution and management of conflict in several situations in Africa (Ikejiaku&Dauda, 2011).

Another theoretical perspective, which may be of vital relevance as far as understanding conflict and resolving African conflicts, is the conflict transformation theory. In the late 1970s, Edward Azar, conceived the conflict transformation theory in a bid to conceptualize the types of intrastate wars that were beginning to be experienced in Africa (Wani, 2010). This theory was the first focused attempt to conceptualize the peculiarity of the ethno-political conflicts taking place in Africa. Therefore, this theory is reasonably pertinent for the appraisal of conflict in Rwandan and Burundi, which share common features with regard to cause, nature and implications. According to the conflict transformation theory, conflict resolution takes places in a transformative process involving relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and reconstruction including regaining humanity and pursuing reconciliation (Wani, 2010)

### **UN and Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda**

UN has developed an international monitoring (early warning) and management of the Rwanda conflict. Using the techniques of critical policy analysis, the study weighs the formulation and execution of policies against their stated objectives as well as accepted international norms for the behavior of states and organizations. The research is based on a number of sub-studies, secondary sources (books and articles by academics and journalists, media studies, reports, etc.) as well as considerable primary data collected through inter-views and document searches in the UN system (New York and Geneva), the NGO community, and visits to national capitals in Europe and North America (Paris, Rome, Brussels, London, Washington and Ottawa), and in Africa (Nairobi, Kigali, Kampala, and Dares-Salaam).

The study begins with the refugee problem prior to 1990, follows the civil war, then covers the build-up to the coup on 6 April 1994. The following 10 weeks are traced to understand the tardy international response to the genocide of more than a half a million persons mainly belonging to the minority Tutsi community, but including moderate Hutu political opponents of the regime. The concluding historical analysis reviews the security issues of the refugee camps in Zaire and the displaced persons camps in the south-west corner of Rwanda.

### **Actions and reactions in the developing conflict**

By failing to deal with the festering refugee problem prior to 1990, both the Rwandese and the Ugandan governments set the stage for future conflict. Although the issue of Rwandese refugees in Uganda defied easy solutions, opportunities that existed remained unexplored or were not aggressively pursued. With the exception of Tanzania, the regional states were either indifferent or part of the problem. States further afield showed little interest. UNHCR was overburdened, understaffed, and lacked political or economic leverage to develop the requisite pressure to help resolve the issue, which, at that time, seemed minor in the global scale of refugee problems.

However, the refugee problem was becoming explosive. The build-up of tension leading to the 1990 invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) forces was accompanied by many tell-tale signs, but was inadequately monitored. When the invasion was a fait accompli, however, it caused considerable international concern and reaction, both in the region and in Europe. France and Zaire came to the aid of the Rwandese government. Other actors, including Belgium, the OAU, and key - regional states initiated diplomatic efforts to defuse the conflict.

One source of concern related to the principles at stake. The RPF forces that attacked across the border from Uganda consisted not only of refugees invoking their right of return, but constituted a significant segment of the army of Uganda. The invasion violated basic norms designed to ensure

The initial diplomatic efforts eventually led to the Arusha peace talks, initiated and led by the OAU and Tanzania. The process received considerable international attention and support and resulted in a comprehensive settlement. The United Nations assumed formal responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords, but failed, however, to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states in this regard. As a consequence, there was a disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phases that contributed to undermining the Accords.

From 1990 onwards, civil violence against the minority Tutsi community and regime critics gradually escalated. Observers commonly linked the violence to the civil war, either as retaliatory measures or as warnings to the advancing RPF forces. However, two authoritative reports – one by an independent International Commission of Inquiry, and another prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights – suggested a more radical and comprehensive design that foreshadowed events to come. Both reports determined that the killings were genocidal in nature and that existing authorities were substantially involved. As the war continued and the outlines of a peace formula took shape, additional reports indicated that Hutu extremists were organizing and arming themselves to - derail the peace process and massacre “internal enemies”. The creation of documented structures of violence (death squads, death lists, and, later, hate propaganda inciting violence) provided warnings of a potential genocide.

The UN Commission on Human Rights took little notice of its own report. Except for pointed diplomatic protests by Belgium, the findings of the international human rights inquiry were mostly filed away in national ministries and the UN system. With the partial exception of Canada, no state - observed the recommendation to impose strict human rights conditionality on aid transfers. Some -states were indifferent, others were concerned but concluded that the ongoing democratization process and the peace talks required their continued economic and political support, particularly since the peace agreement under negotiation would produce a new governmental structure that it was hoped would address human rights abuses. In this way, donors became hostage to their own policies.

Human rights organizations and states were also at odds on the issue of arms supplies. In 1992 and 1993, the former recommended that states (France and Uganda were obvious targets) cut off all arms supplies to the parties in the conflict. France openly defended its role and the right of a sovereign state to support a beleaguered friendly government. Uganda denied any involvement in helping the rebel army, yet its territory constituted the rear base for the RPF forces. The aid conditionality and an international arms embargo in the 1990-93 period have defused the conflict and prevented the genocide? Effective use of human rights conditionality is difficult, requiring fine-tuned and timely intervention. Arguably, there were windows of opportunity, particularly in mid-1992, when more pressure could have been put on the Habyarimana regime to deal with the extremist forces as well as the critical issue of impunity. Also military assistance (direct and indirect) to the Rwandese protagonists could have been calibrated better with the continuing peace process, particularly in dealing



with the central issue of extremist forces who opposed the Arusha process and resultant Accords.

Though such speculations are debatable, firmer conclusions can be drawn about what did happen. By not standing firm on human rights conditionality, donors collectively sent the message that their priorities lay elsewhere. By permitting arms to reach the Rwandese protagonists, the possibilities for demilitarizing the conflict were reduced. Arms supplies reinforced the determination of both parties to seek a military and forceful solution to a political conflict. They strengthened the RPF's ability to advance militarily. They permitted the government to equip and expand its armed forces as well as para-military units, both of which became involved in the genocide.

When, as a result of the Arusha process, the Hutu extremists were excluded from the key instruments of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and marginalized in the political process, alternative strategies were not developed to defang those extremists. The UN force (UNAMIR) sent to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement was given a mandate tailored to a classic, minimalist peacekeeping operation. Yet the force faced a situation considered by many – including some of those who planned the operation – as dangerously unstable. As the architects of the Arusha Accords had foreseen, conditions in Rwanda suggested a mandate with broader powers to protect civilians and seize arms caches. Further, the UN Security Council established a force that was structured and financed to satisfy a cost-conscious United States, increasingly unwilling to support UN peacekeeping, rather than to meet the needs on the ground. The force was inadequately supported and slowly deployed relative to the need for speed considered essential to maintain the peace process – though relatively rapidly given the normally cumbersome UN procedures. The operation had no flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, in particular those – caused by the crisis in neighboring Burundi in October 1993.

In the months immediately preceding the genocide, many additional signs indicated that the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that massive violence was being planned. The air was full of extremist rhetoric on radio, in public rallies and at official cocktail parties. There were assassinations and organized violence. Detailed intelligence reports were passed to New York and the Belgian military authorities by the unofficial UNAMIR intelligence unit documenting the military training of militias, hidden arms caches, and plans for violent action. Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding a planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out;

provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the capital. The cable was placed in a separate Black File, designed to draw attention to its content, and circulated to several departments in the UN Secretariat. However, senior officials in the Secretariat questioned the validity of the information and made no contingency plans for worst-case scenarios. Similar intelligence failures were evident on the state level, particularly in France and Belgium, both of which had a considerable capacity for overt and covert information gathering in Rwanda at the time.

Thus pieces of information were available that, if put together and analyzed, would have permitted policy-makers to draw the conclusion that both political assassinations and genocide might occur, and that the scale would be different from past patterns (1959-1963; 1991-1993) of “just” hundreds or thousands of victims. Yet this analysis was not done. Although some had available fragments of prescient and significant information, the enormity of the genocide took virtually all by surprise. The failure to anticipate planned and targeted mass murder was particularly significant given the political commitment and actual involvement of the UN in Rwanda, the legal right and moral obligation to act to prevent genocide according to the Genocide Convention, and the enormous cost of a miscalculation.

While mandated to help implement the peace agreement, the UN made no preparations to deal with a breakdown of the Accords, except to withdraw. Nor were there contingency preparations to deal with the plans to scuttle the Accords or the massive violence plotted by the extremists. Generally, the UN Secretariat interpreted UNAMIR’s mandate and terms of engagement narrowly, and on several occasions denied the Force Commander permission to search for and seize arms caches. When developments in early 1994 further eroded the peace accords, the Secretary-General and the Security Council threatened to withdraw the UN force, hence strengthening the hands of the extremists. No member of the Security Council came forward to suggest a different course of action. On the contrary, the Council kept UNAMIR on a tight leash with only a three months’ authorization, accompanied by admonitions of caution and cost-cutting.

### **Crisis and response**

In the months before the crisis struck, UNAMIR presence contributed to a false sense of security in Rwanda. When events came to a head on 6 April, the UN collectively failed. There was an - absence of leadership at UN headquarters in New York. The Secretary-General, travelling at a brisk pace through Europe, misread the nature of the conflict. The understaffed and overstretched

Department of Peace-Keeping Operations seemed paralyzed. In the Security Council, the killing of 10 Belgian peacekeepers created a political surge to withdraw, although this was not recommended by UNAMIR's Force Commander nor African countries contributing troops. Information on the genocide under way was already available when the final decision was made to reduce the force drastically.

Once the direction and magnitude of the genocide became undeniable, the UN reversed itself and - accepted an obligation to protect civilians. However, the realization of this peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR II) was hampered by the unwillingness of key members to pay for or provide troops, and to match troops with equipment in an expeditious manner. The force was deployed only after the genocide and the civil war had ended.

France's role in Rwanda was significant but marked by multiple contradictions. While warning the Security Council in early 1993 that massacres were a real possibility, France supported a regime that was deeply compromised by human rights violations. France urged the UN, rather than the OAU, to take the lead in monitoring and implementing the peace agreement, but subsequently did little to support UNAMIR I. Nor did France pledge support for UNAMIR II, even though the French Foreign Minister was the first cabinet member of a government holding a permanent seat on the Security Council to identify the massacres as genocide (16 May 1994). With the aid of some of its African ex-colonies, France subsequently undertook a unilateral intervention; *Operation Turquoise*, endorsed by a Chapter VII Security Council resolution. The action saved many lives and undoubtedly prevented an additional mass outflow of refugees from the southwest of Rwanda, but came very late - two and a half months after the genocide commenced and when the civil war was - almost over. Further, the intervention was open to misinterpretation, and did not serve to disarm the extremists or prevent suspected organizers of the genocide from escaping.

After massive numbers of refugees, retreating government forces, and the assumed perpetrators of the genocide crossed into Zaire and Tanzania in April-July 1994, UNHCR warned the UN in New York about the attendant security problems in the refugee camps. The Secretariat took the unprecedented step of examining the issue in a peacekeeping context, but the Security Council proved unsupportive. After significant delays, the problem fell back into the hands of UNHCR, which resorted to a novel and reasonably effective solution to police the refugee camps. The arrangement did not and could not deal with the broader security threats posed by the existence of militarized communities in exile, and this problem was left to fester.

The large concentrations of internally displaced persons in south-west Rwanda presented a domestic version of similar problems. These came to a head when the Kibeho camp was closed in April 1995. The operation resulted in the killing of large numbers of men, women and children, mostly by Rwandese government forces firing on IDPs, but also by extremists within the camp. The disastrous outcome notwithstanding, the coordinated efforts that went into the planning of the Kibeho operation by UN agencies, NGOs and the new Rwandese government were steps in the right direction. Although the execution was faulty, the faults were not inherent in the decision-making model of coordination, which could be utilized in the future. Similarly, the arrangement for providing security for refugees in Zaire exemplifies a workable solution to a difficult problem.

During the whole conflict, but especially after the coup on 6 April, the overall failure of the media to report accurately and adequately on a crime against humanity significantly contributed to international disinterest in the genocide and the consequent inadequate response.

### **The consequences of genocide in Rwanda**

Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda. The genocide has transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. It has also profoundly affected the existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwandese genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.

The International community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the culprits by establishing an International Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programmes in Rwanda. It has treated and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of assistance programmes and alienated the present government. For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the genocide; by and large, they have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced with assistance to survivors.

The international community apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust – and even the open hostility – of the Rwandese government towards the UN human rights field operation. Its legitimacy has been vastly compromised - because it is perceived as one-sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on - crimes against humanity. Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, the cultural insensitivity of the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human dimensions of the genocide as perceived by the Rwandese. Perhaps the most lamentable example was the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely.

#### **Summary of Rwanda Crisis and Ways Forward**

Throughout the various phases of a complex emergency the constituted authority of the country in crisis always bears major responsibilities for resolving it. This has been true at virtually every stage of the Rwanda crisis since there has always been a duly constituted authority, with perhaps the exception of several weeks during May–July 1994. The responsibilities range from protecting human, civil and refugee rights to peaceful conflict resolution; to ensuring an open and fair system of justice; to creating a stable and open enabling environment for economic activity; to protecting the poorest and the most vulnerable. As concluded by Study IV, the responsibilities for rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction belong to the Rwandese.

A current example is repatriation. With the possibility of significant external impediments being removed by the recent arrests in Zaire of former extremist leaders, political, judicial and economic conditions inside Rwanda have become even more important for successful repatriation. However, the international community, which has urged progress on these fronts, needs to continue to find ways to assist Rwandese and their government in their efforts to rebuild society.

#### **Upholding international law: a reproach and admonishment to UN member states**

The Rwanda crisis is replete with instances of violation of international law by some member states as well as derelictions of responsibility of others to champion action directed at violators.

The types of international law that were violated fall into three broad categories

- i. First and foremost is The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948. The perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda clearly stand guilty of violating the Convention. The rest of the international community violated the spirit if not the letter of Article VIII of the Convention, which states that “Any contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III”.
- ii. Second is International Humanitarian Law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional Protocols of 1977. Member states have an obligation to disseminate knowledge of international humanitarian law as widely as possible and to adopt any national measures and enact any legislation to provide for effective implementation of international humanitarian law.
- iii. Third are international norms, particularly well-developed in African regional international law, regarding the rights of refugees to repatriate and stability of relations among states. Member states must take invasions across borders seriously, initially at sub-regional and regional levels, to defuse and contain the resulting conflict. The international community must also support states most directly concerned to ensure that refugees are not left in limbo, but within a reasonable time obtain secure membership in a state. Had effective and prompt action successfully addressed these issues involving Rwanda and Uganda in the 1980s and in 1990, the tragedies of the ensuing years could have been averted.

### **Conclusion**

International response to the humanitarian crisis provoked by the civil war and genocide has been generous and, in the emergency phase, rapid. Greater ambiguity about objectives, the legitimacy and capacity of the new government and the durability of peace, coupled with more deliberate (and hence time-consuming) processes for development assistance, have led to delays in assistance for reconstruction and development. In some cases simple political miscalculations have led to dead-lock between government and donors.

Finally, the international community cannot be expected to do everything, nor should it try to do so. Most of the responsibility for reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and recovery belongs to the Rwandese. The ultimate determinant of the durability of solutions will be the degree to which they themselves believe in them and have, or would have, instituted them even without outside assistance. Nonetheless, the international community has already brought and can bring many - resources to bear on the crisis. How these are used can tilt the balance in favor of peace and reconciliation and away from war and destruction.

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