

# **WAR AND STRIFE IN AFRICA: EMERGING ISSUES OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR**

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## **ABSTRACT**

**T**he problem facing African States today is the emergence of various categories pockets of conflicts that has seriously affecting structures such as political process, economic, environmental and excessive violation of fundamental Human Rights in many African countries. Africa is one of the worst victims of violent conflicts in the world. Many states have been battered and collapsed as a result of the many fratricidal wars, intractable political conflicts and economic insolence. The people have become more pauperized, hopeless and helpless victims of wars, repressive and corrupt governments, and economic adjustments that have had devastating and conflict-worsening consequences. African conflicts are not only more prevalent than earlier period; it is more virulent and destructive because its implications lie within both the state and the region. This study attempts to answer the following questions; is there a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan? And, did the conflict

## **Introduction:**

The African continent presents the image of a continent that has been ravaged by conflicts. There is hardly any part of Africa where violent conflict has not been witnessed. There is no gain saying the obvious that Africa, since the eve of the 21st century, has been challenged by a variety of complex political, economic, environmental and social upheavals in various degrees and intensity that is unprecedented in the continent. These challenges have launched the continent into a series of devastating intra state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half. Eight of the fifteen—complex emergencies|| declared by the

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*resolution mechanisms adopted by the UNAMID facilitate the resolution of the conflict in Darfur? The Structural Functional approach was employed as our theoretical framework. Using this approach, this study attempts to look at the factors that delayed the UN in responding to the Darfur crisis and also the strategies and constraints that affected the UNAMID in its attempt to carry out its function towards resolving the Darfur crisis. Methodologically, the study adopted the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) design that invariably led to the sourcing of data through secondary sources. The paper has findings which revealed that the economic interests of China and Russia delayed the response of the UN to the Darfur crisis due to their continuous vetoing of the resolutions that seek to proffered solutions to the crisis, The papers has also gives another finding which equally revealed that even though the UNAMID tried in their efforts to maintain the cease fire agreement, there were still constraints that prevented it from bringing lasting peace and security to the Darfur region of Sudan. We recommend that the UN Security Council and African Union should take a more proactive role in Peacekeeping operations in the continent through equipping its peacekeeping force so that they will be able to achieve peace in the continent especially Darfur to prevent the loss of lives and the destructions of properties. The government of Sudan should eschew politics of racial cleansing and see the people of Darfur as part of their responsibility to protect and provide for. We equally recommend that China and Russia should not because of their economic interests and investments in Sudan continue to obstruct resolutions that will bring peace and security to Darfur as they have sworn to maintain peace and security in the world, which is one of the cardinal goals of the UN Security Council objective.*

**Keywords:** Conflict, United Nations, Conflict Management, and Security Council

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs were in Africa (Herbst 1998)

Corroborating the above position, Habu, G ( 2002) took a concise view of the continent and states that;

Conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare in central Africa Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda civil war in Sudan and border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia has remained a collapsed state in spite of attempts to resuscitate it. In Southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising Angola was in turmoil. In West Africa, Liberia was almost a

collapsed state, even as rebels embattled Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. While Cote d'ivoire experiences armed rebellion, Sudan is encountering humanitarian catastrophe arising from a bitter intra-state conflict, almost of a genocidal proportion.

For Okereke (2005:1) noted that –Africa presents a continent where life is nasty, brutish and short due to the litany of armed conflicts that has destructive impact on both human and material resources|. With these prevailing conflict situations in many parts of Africa, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan is a very dangerous addition. For a continent that has suffered multiplicity of wars and conflicts, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan constitutes another violent disruption to the peace security and development of the Africa continent (Oche,2008)

The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, just after the government began peace negotiations to resolve the civil war with the south. The loosely aligned Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels attacked government targets in central Darfur and demanded autonomy. After a ceasefire mediated by Chadian President Idriss Déby between the government and rebel groups fell apart in December 2003, Khartoum used the Janjaweed militias to attack the villages populated by African Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa peoples. The SLM/A and JEM draw much of their support from these groups. African farmers and Arabic nomads long have competed for limited resources in western Sudan's Darfur region, particularly following a prolonged drought in 1983. Meanwhile, the Muslim government in the north was engaged in a civil war with rebels in the Christian south. The Sudanese government funded Darfur's Arab militias—which came to be known as the "Janjaweed| or armed –horsemen"—to keep the rebels at bay. This action by the Sudanese Government enflamed Arab-African tensions in Darfur and, as according to United Nations Security Council Special report says, the regime of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir transformed a competition for scarce resources "into a large-scale violent confrontation tinged with serious racial and ethnic overtones."(UN, 2006).

Since the beginning of the conflict, almost 2 million Darfurians—a third of the region's population—have been internally displaced as a result of the systematic destruction of villages; some 200,000 refugees have fled to neighboring Chad. An estimated 350,000 people in the region have died as a result of violence, disease, and starvation, according to a report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner

for Refugees. Sexual violence is rampant, and UN Undersecretary General Jan Egeland told the Security Council in 2005 that "rape is systematically used as a weapon of warfare."

The humanitarian situation remains catastrophic due to ongoing state-sponsored violence, layers of aid obstruction, the lack of an overall humanitarian strategic plan, and the weakened state of displaced Sudanese. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), a disproportionate number of them women, are in terribly weakened states, subject to sexual abuse and without adequate shelter. The numbers of at-risk civilians continue to increase. And as need far outstrips the ability of agencies to deliver aid, and access is restricted due to instability, localized famine is feared.

The African Union (AU), sent monitors to oversee the 2003 peace negotiations. After those talks failed in 2004, the African Union sent around 3,000 troops to protect the observers there and provide security. There are now about 7,000 AU soldiers in Darfur, which many experts say falls short of the actual security presence needed. The well-meaning but ill-conceived peacekeeping mission by the African Union failed to stop the massacres and destruction of villages. This prompted the UN Security Council, in spite of reluctance on the part of China and Russia, to call for greater UN and NATO involvement in the crisis, against the wishes of the government in Khartoum. Noting the AMIS resource deficiencies, the deteriorating security conditions in Darfur, and the threats of some AMIS member states to withdraw participation (Africa Action 2007), the international community began to unite more firmly around the idea of collective intervention in 2006. Prompted by threats to international peace and security, Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the UK, Tanzania and the US co-sponsored a resolution on a UN peacekeeping force that would send 17 300 military and 3 300 civilian police personnel to Darfur as a Chapter VII mission. The aim of the resolution was to reinforce the AMIS effort and reduce the large-scale violence in Darfur (UN, 2006). Bashir's government voiced opposition to the presence of UN troops in Sudan, claiming that a UN presence would call into question the nation's sovereignty. Initially, China and Russia opposed the Security Council resolution due to their economic interests in Sudan, but they eventually abstained as a result of the international pressures that was brought to bear on them especially China that was threatened by the international Olympic Committee which threatened to take away the hosting right from her if

she fail to persuade Sudan to allow the UN AU hybrid peacekeeping force access in to Darfur.

This study therefore is intended to investigate and explore the underlying factors that informed China and Russia's delay in adopting UN Security Council resolution towards resolving the conflict in Darfur and the mechanism used UNAMID in the management of the Darfur crisis.

### **Research Questions**

This study intends to examine the strategies used by UNAMID and how effective these strategies were in the resolution of the Darfur crisis in Sudan. It is within this context that this study seeks to answer the following questions:

- I. Is there a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan?
- II. Did the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the UNAMID facilitate the resolution of the conflict in Darfur?

### **Objectives of the Study**

This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective of this study is to examine the contributions of the UN in conflict management in Africa with emphasis on the Darfur region. The specific objective of this study is:

- I. To examine if there a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan.
- II. To examine if the mechanism adopted by the UNAMID has facilitated conflict resolution of the Darfur crisis.

### **Significance of the Study**

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically this study will add new vistas to the ever growing literature in conflict management and other emerging scenario in Darfur. This study will expose the relationship between the delay in deploying the UNAMMID and the protection and preservation of the economic interests of China and Russia. In that stead, students, scholars, diplomats and other members of the public with interest in the field of conflict management will find this piece very rewarding.

It will also provide information through recommendations on the practical ways of improving the strategies, functions and role the UN peacekeeping mission especially as regard the improvement of the human condition, maintenance of the cease fire agreement and the achievement of a permanent peace in Darfur. This study is important because despite the problems encountered by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur, it will demonstrate the importance of not delaying the deployment of UN Peacekeeping Missions to trouble spots in the world in order to maintain cease fire and give peace a chance.

Finally, this study is a further input to increasing volumes of available literature in the area of conflict, peace and security Africa and will also serve as a reference point to the present and future researchers who are or might be eager to find solution to the myriad of problems facing African democracies.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is anchored on the structural-functional analysis that is a derivation of the General System theory of political analysis and as propounded by Almond and Coleman (1960) and Almond and Powell, (1966). The structural functional analysis is another derivative of the systems approach. Coming in through sociology and originating mainly in the writings of anthropologists like Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, and adopted in political science, especially in comparative politics by Gabriel Almond, structural functional analysis is basically concerned with the phenomenon of system maintenance and regulation. The basic theoretical proposition of this approach is that all systems exist to perform functions through their structures. The central question of this approach, as Young (1966) says, is: 'what structures fulfill what basic functions and under what conditions in any given society'?

The basic assumptions of the structural-functional derivative of the systems approach are:

- 1) Society is a single inter-connected system in which each of its elements performs a specific function and whose basic goal is the maintenance of the systemic equilibrium;
- 2) Society, being a system as a whole, consists of its numerous parts which are inter-related;
- 3) The dominant tendency of the social system is towards stability which is maintained by its own in-built mechanism;
- 4) System's ability to resolve internal conflicts is usually an admitted fact;

5) Changes in the system are natural, but they are neither sudden nor revolutionary, but are always gradual and adaptive as well as adjective.

6) System has its own structure, with its own aims, principles and functions.

The structural-functional derivative speaks of the political system as composed of several structures as patterns of action and resultant institutions with their assigned functions. A function, in this context, means, as Plato (Dictionary of Political Analysis) says, 'some purpose served with respect to the maintenance or perpetuation of the system', and a structure could be related to "any set of related roles, including such concrete organizational structures as political parties and legislatures." So the structural-functional analysis, Piano continues, "involves the identification of a set of requisite or at least recurring functions in the kind of system under investigation. This is coupled with an attempt to determine the kinds of structures and their interrelations through which those functions are performed. "Structural-Functionalism as a theoretical framework is intended to explain the basis for the maintenance of order and stability in society and the relevant arrangement within the society, which maintain the social order and stability. In our formation of a structural functional framework, social processes and social mechanisms are the intervening variables.

A complete description of a social system would include therefore, a treatment of the social structures, and various functions of these structures; and of the social processes and mechanisms that must be in operation if the structures are to satisfy certain functions (Holt, 1967). It is Holt's view that structural functional analysis is a distinguishable approach primarily because of the selective aspects of social reality that it seeks to describe largely in terms of structures, processes, mechanisms and functions. These four concepts are of particular importance in the laws and theories that are developed.

The origin of modern functionalism can be traced to Comte. The prominent theorists of structural-functionalism are Herbert Spencer (1874-96); Gabriel Almond (1966); Parsons (1937, 1961); Merton (1957); Davis (1959); Evans-Pritchard (1940); Meyer Fortes (1945); etc. Almond (1966), one of the principal proponents of structural-functionalism, argues that every political system performs certain functions. He adopted Easton's systems analysis and stressed the functions which could be included among the input and output functions of all political systems. The inputs are the functions of interest articulation, and interest aggregation; while the outputs are the functions of rulemaking, rule application and rule adjudication. According to Almond, the functioning of any

political system may also be viewed in terms of its capabilities, which is the way it performs as a unit in its environment. The concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, symbolic and responsive capabilities are employed as criteria to assess how a system is performing within its environment, how it is shaping its environment, and how it is being shaped by the environment as well.

The Structural-Functional analysis was first experimented in the biological and mechanical sciences as part of system analysis. It was adopted as a model of analysis in sociology and Anthropology. It was developed for political analysis by Gabriel Almond (Haralambos, 1980). According Varma ( cited in Okolie, 2003), structural-functionalism revolves around two main concepts namely; functions and structures on the basis of which Varma raised three basic questions – (1) What basic functions are fulfilled in any given political system?(2)Bywhatstructures?(3)Underwhatconditions?Hestressesthatwhilefunctionsdeals with the consequences (i.e. involving objectives as well as processes) of patterns of actions, structures refers to arrangements within the systems, which performs the functions. Although Comte may be defined as a structural-functionalist, the perspective was developed primarily through the works of Emile Durkheim, who emphasized the central role that moral consequences plays in maintaining social order and creating equilibrium or a normal state of society.

### **Method of Data Collection**

This study has generate data from existing reports of both local and international observers groups and Peacekeeping missions reports on the Darfur crisis, articles published in journals, books, and conference papers that deals with the cause of the crisis and the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur which is a response to the failure of the AU peacekeeping/observer mission to maintain the ceasefire agreement and the protection of the civilian population in Darfur and the role played by China and Russia who are permanent members with veto power of the UN Security Council.

### **Method of Data Analysis**

We will rely on qualitative descriptive analysis. Asika (2006) defines qualitative descriptive analysis as summarizing the information generated in the research verbally so as to further discover relationship among variables. The adoption of the analytical method becomes necessary hence the sources of data. This technique is also known as content analysis.



According to Obikeze (1990), this technique was developed as a result of the need for a reliable scientific method for assessing, analyzed scientific method and interpreting a large variety of materials. We therefore, relied heavily (but in no way exclusively) on this analytical technique to evaluate the data generated for this study. In other words, content analysis will enable us to analyze how the delay in adopting the UN Security Council resolution on Darfur affected the ability and capacity of UNAMID to help resolve the Darfur conflict. Darfur: Historical Background

The Republic of Sudan, the largest country in Africa in terms of land mass, lies on the western shore of the Red Sea. It is bordered by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Egypt to the north. Darfur is the most underdeveloped region in the country and is prone to drought and famines; two factors which have fuelled conflict between nomadic Arab tribes, armed by the government, militias and local African villagers.

The Darfur region, divided into the states of North, South and West Darfur, is the western-most part of Sudan. Darfur's 160,000 square miles make up one fifth of Sudan. It is an expanse of desert in the north through to savannah in the south. Geographically, it is made up of a plateau some 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea-level. The volcanic Jebel Marra mountain range runs north and south for a distance of some 100 miles, rising to between 5,000 and 6,000 feet. Darfur's six million or so inhabitants comprise one seventh of Sudan's population. They are made up of farmers growing sorghum, millet, groundnuts and other market vegetables and nomadic cattle and camel pastoralists.

Formerly an independent sultanate, and named after the Fur tribe (—Dar|| means land – of the Fur), Darfur was incorporated into Sudan by the British government in 1917. Some of its borders were not finalized until as late as 1938. Previously administered as one entity, Darfur was divided into three states in the early 1990s. Al-Fashir, historically the capital of Darfur, is now the capital of North Darfur state; Nyala is the capital of South Darfur state; and al-Geneina is the capital of West Darfur state. Each state has a regional assembly, and a governor appointed by central government. Darfur is strategically placed, bordering Libya to the north-west, Chad to the west, and the Central African Republic to the south-west. Culturally, Darfur is part of a belt from Mauritania to the Red Sea.

The population of the Darfur province consisted of many tribes – between forty and ninety depending on definitions – that distinguished themselves as ethnically and culturally—Arab||or —African||(Flint and de Waal 2008: 6).

Alex de Waal (2004) writes that –discernible racial or religious differences between Africans’ and Arabs’|| in Darfur have never existed. All people in Darfur are black, Muslim, followers of Sunni Islam, and they for centuries lived in relative peace (Baldo, 2006). Rather than by skin color or other physical traits, the people in Darfur have always identified themselves in—ethno-cultural or tribal terms|| (El-Tigani Mahmoud 2004: 3). Jerome Tubiana (2007: 70), Sudan expert from France, explains the divide, or the lack of, between the —Arabs|| and—Africans|| in Darfur which were often misinterpreted and manipulated in Darfur and Sudan:

The divide is not based on skin color. It is not based on religion. Nor is it based on culture, as Arabs and non-Arabs share strong cultural traits and bonds. It is not based on language—[many]non-Arab groups speak Arabic as the native tongue...Rather, the basis for the cleavage is the claim to an Arab identity that has less to do with the above criteria than it does with often-fictional matrilineal lineages that lead back to mythical Arab forbearers. There may be little, if any, historical accuracy to these constructs. But to those who invoke them, they are fact and truth. The political situation in post-independence Sudan, where a long civil war had been fought between the —Arab|| north and —African|| south, began politicizing Darfur’s ethnic groups and tribes (Prunier 2005: 46). Successive governments of Sudan saw Darfurians, both—Arabs||and—Africans,||as a—major constituency of devout Muslim that could be mobilized|| to fight against the southerners, (de Waal 2004a), during the two north-south wars, the Darfur province supplied the largest number of soldiers who fought on the —Arab|| side against—African|| south (Premier 2005: 78; Mohammed 2008). At the same time, the government completely neglected Darfur —in the series of Islamist projects aimed at social transformation|| (de Waal 2004a).

The largest ethnic group within Darfur is the Fur people, who consist mainly of settled subsistence farmers and traditional cultivators. Other non-Arab, —African||, groups include the Zaghawa nomads, the Meidob, Massaleit, Dajo, Berti, Kanein, Mima, Bargo, Barno, Gimir, Tama, Mararit, Fellata, Jebel, Sambat and Tunjur. The mainly pastoralist Arab tribes in Darfur include Habania, Beni

Hussein, Zeiyadiya, Beni Helba, Ateefat, Humur, Khuzam, Khawabeer, Beni Jarrar, Mahameed, Djawama, Rezeigat, and the Ma'aliyah.

Darfur is an ecologically fragile area which had already seen growing – and often armed conflict over natural resources between some 80 tribes and clans loosely divided between nomadic and sedentary communities. Sudanese academics such as Professors Richard Lobban and Sean O'Fahey have stated: –This conflict has emerged at the present in the context of persistent ecological crises of increased desertification and lack of production and limited grazing lands among the pastoralist and agricultural peoples.|| O'Fahey has noted that—desertification accelerated by droughts led to pressure on water and grazing resources...Conflicts over wells that in earlier times had been settled with spears or mediation became much more intractable in an era awash with guns.|| Desertification and drought had forced a number of tribal migrations from the 1970s onwards and by the late 1980s, as noted by Darfurian writer Ismail Abakr Ahmed, –the migrant groups increased in numbers, and in the absence of social harmony, tribal factions developed and culminated in violent conflicts.||

These inter-tribal and intra-tribal conflicts, some between nomadic communities and farmers, and some within nomadic and farming communities themselves, were a feature from the late 1950s onwards. The following are some of the armed tribal conflicts that have taken place within Darfur since independence: 1957, Meidob against Kababish caused by mutual raiding for camels and disputed territorial access; 1968, Rezeigat against Ma'aliyah, caused by disputed access and livestock theft; 1969, Zaghawa against northern Rezeigat, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1974, Zaghawa against Birgid, caused by disputed access to farming land and livestock theft; 1976, Beni Helba against northern Rezeigat, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1980, northern Rezeigat against Beni Helba, Birgid, Dajo, and Fur, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1980, Taisha against Salamat, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1982, Kababish and Khawabeer against Meidob, Berti and Zeiyadiya, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1984, Missairiya against Rezeigat, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1987, Gimir and Mararit against Fellata, caused by disputed access to pasture and water and livestock theft; 1989, the Fur of Kabkabiya against the Zaghawa, over disputed territorial access and livestock theft; 1989, the Fur against various Arab tribes, caused by disputed territorial access and political

conflict; and 1989, Gimir against Zaghawa, caused by disputed territorial access and livestock theft. Six of these 13 conflicts were fought between Arab nomadic communities: four of the conflicts were between parties who were both non-Arab. All of these were serious armed conflicts, sometimes involving thousands of tribesmen, with combatants increasingly well-armed with automatic weapons and vehicles. As is also apparent from the tribes involved, the violence was both within and across ethnic divides. The Sudanese national commission documented 36 major inter and intra-tribal conflicts from 1932-2001.

John Ryle has noted: —Low-level fighting among communities in western Sudan (all of which are Muslim) has been endemic since the late 1980s, when a war broke out between the Arabs and the Fur, two of the ethnic groups involved in the present conflict.||67 Much of this violence also had cross-border implications, with affected communities, such as the Salamat, often straddling the Sudan-Chad frontier. From 1983-87, as some northern Darfur tribes moved south into the central farming belt because of the drought, the Zaghawa and Ma'aliyah came into armed conflict with Fur communities. This conflict and others involving the Fur led to thousands of deaths, tens of thousands of displaced Darfurians and the destruction of thousands of homes. It was settled by a government-mediated intertribal conference in 1989. The 1990s were marked by three distinct conflicts. In 1990 the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army unsuccessfully tried to start an insurgency, led by Fur activist Daud Bolad, amongst non-Arab communities; in 1996 there was a long-running conflict between the Rezeigat and the Zaghawa; and from 1997- 99 there was fighting in western Darfur between the Massaleit and some Arab tribes. The SPLA- inspired insurgency was defeated within a matter of months and, generally speaking, inter-tribal conferences and conciliation, Janjaweed and mutamarat al sulh, settled most of the other disputes. Amnesty International's picture of Darfur pre-rebellion also overlaps with inter-ethnic tensions: —The lack of employment opportunities, the proliferation of small arms and the example of militia raiding and looting in Kordofan and the south, have encouraged banditry, acts of armed robbery and general insecurity.|| The simple fact is that all these factors existed well before 2003.

### **Historical Background to the Sudan Conflict**

The first harbinger of future-armed conflict in Darfur was an uprising in El Fasher in 1980 to protest against the appointment of a governor for Darfur who was not

from the region. Elections that took on a distinctly ethnic dimension and a regional government that reflected the ethnic loyalties of the winning faction followed this. Tensions in the region were exacerbated by the drought and famine of 1984-85, which led to large-scale migration and the search by desert-edge ethnic groups for greener pastures elsewhere. At that time, the Zaghawa from the far north intensified their settlement of certain areas in eastern and southern Darfur, while hard-hit Arab pastoralist groups that were losing their herds sought farmland in parts of western Darfur.

Darfur had always been the locus of armed clashes over herds, migration routes, and disputed farmland. Community leaders contained all these conflicts, usually by the reorganization of administrative units. None of them had a wider political, ethnic or ideological character, and the level of firearms technology used was uniformly low. However, in the mid-1980s, automatic weapons became readily available as the conflicts in Chad and southern Sudan spread in to Darfur.

The immediate cause of the first violent conflict in Darfur was a spillover from Chad. A militia, led and principally composed of Chadian Arabs set up a rear base in Darfur in 1987, and was repeatedly attacked by Chadian government and French military forces. Retreating in to central Darfur, this group, the Conseil Democratique Révolutionnaire or (CDR), made common cause with Darfurians Arab groups which had been impoverished and left landless following the 1984-85 drought and famine, and ignited the first internal war in Darfur. This was when the term

—Janjaweed first came in to more generalized use. It coincided with heightened ethnic and racial awareness, with the infiltration of some Arab supremacist individuals and their agendas, in parallel to a growing identification among Fur and Masalit activists of their —African identity|| with the potential to make common cause with the SPLM in southern Sudan. The conflict was ended with the defeat and surrender of the Chadian CDR faction, followed by an inter-tribal peace conference in El Fashir. The drawback of this process was that it treated the conflict solely as an internal inter-ethnic dispute and ignored its wider political dimensions, and it therefore lacked a capable mechanism for enforcement and follow up.

Another round of the Chadian civil war was fought out in Darfur following the March 1989 attempted coup against Hissène Habré. Following the failure of the coup attempt, some of the forces involved took refuge in Darfur. At the end of 1990, these forces, backed by the Sudan Government, used Darfur as the launch-

pad and successfully took power in N'djamena. The subsequent security pact between Khartoum and N'djamena was that each would deny its territory as a rear base to attack the other. During the decade in which this deal held, conflicts in both Darfur and Chad occurred, but were contained and did not spiral out of control. In December 1991, an SPLA unit headed by an ethnic Fur and former Muslim Brother, Daud Bolad, penetrated Darfur with the intent of initiating an insurrection. The unit was intercepted and defeated by a combination of army units and militia. A brief period of repression followed, which included the rounding up of Bolad's secret cells. After an administrative reorganization in Western Darfur in 1995, which threatened to reduce the authority of the Masalit Sultan and potentially make the Masalit junior partners in an administration dominated by Arabs, there was an intense localized conflict in that area. The Arabs accused the Masalit of intending to exclude them entirely from local administration, access to land and services. The Masalit accused the Arabs of working with the Government to take over their land. The conflict, which raged in several rounds of fighting from 1995 to 1999, ended decisively with the Sudan Government clampdown and show of force, followed by inter-tribal reconciliation. During this period, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, a Darfurians-based opposition group aligned with the National Democratic Alliance based in Asmara, tried to instigate a wider rebellion, but due to the refusal of the Chadian Government to support it, it failed to obtain a foothold.

Following the internal power struggle and split within the Islamist movement in 1999-2000, some Darfurians Islamists left the Government and began mobilizing in opposition. Among them were significant numbers of ethnic Zaghawa. For the first time, the possibility emerged of an alliance between Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa - a prospect which was extremely alarming to the Sudan Government and to the Darfurians Arabs. The beginning of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), at that time known clandestinely as the Darfur Liberation Front, can be traced to meetings between Zaghawa and Fur leaders in 2001. Deeply concerned by this, the Government began counter measures which included distributing arms to Arab groups. By 2002, there was fierce fighting in several parts of central and northern Darfur and already tens of thousands of people were displaced.

The clandestine Darfur resistance secured a major breakthrough when they won military support and a tacit political alliance with the SPLM in southern Sudan in late 2002. Although the SPLM was deeply involved in peace negotiations with the Sudan Government at the time, it was simultaneously pursuing a strategy of

intensifying the political and military pressure on Khartoum, and saw a chance of supporting a new front in Darfur. Combined with financial resources from dissident Islamists and access to weapons supplies illicitly in Chad, this provided the Darfur resistance with the means to expand its military operations and, for the first time, pose a significant threat to the Sudan Government.

The SLM, and its armed wing, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), declared itself in February 2003 with an assault on a police post at Golo followed by a public announcement. It published a manifesto that its cadres had drawn up with the assistance of the SPLM. JEM declared itself the following month. At that time, the governor of North Darfur, Ibrahim Suleiman, was engaged in peace talks and saw the likely solution to the conflict in the form of settling local disputes, controlling renegade militias, and providing stepped-up development assistance and services.

However, a rebel attack on the Government air base at El Fashir in April 2003 proved a humiliating reverse for the armed forces and sparked intense recruitment by the army. Unable or unwilling to count upon the loyalty of many army and paramilitary units in Darfur, the Government relied heavily on mobilizing militia, especially Arab groups that were fearful of what they saw as an aggressive and exclusivist political agenda of the Fur-Zaghawa alliance.

One of the root causes of the present crisis goes back to the mid-1980s when prolonged droughts speeded up the desertification process in northern and central Darfur, which in turn led to much pressure on water and grazing resources, as the camel nomads were forced to move southwards and become farmers. This intensified pressure on grazing and water. Conflicts over wells, which in earlier times were settled with spears or, hopefully mediation by elders or religious figures, became much more intractable when the area started to become awash with guns, largely brought in from Chad or Libya.

The militarization of the crisis has grown ever since Sadiq al-Mahdi while Prime Minister in the mid-1980s took the disastrous decision to give arms to the Baqqara of southern Darfur ostensibly to defend them against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). No one was very surprised when they started to turn the guns on their northern neighbors, the Fur, Masalit, etc. The SPLA exacerbated the situation by trying to open a front in southern Darfur under Daoud Bolad, an Islamist turned Darfurians nationalist. It was at this time that the Arab tribal militias, first called murahilin, now janjaweed, began to go out of control.

**Table 1. Military Regimes and Democratic Governments in Sudan since Independence**

Date	Government
1 January 1956	Sudan becomes an independent republic based on a democracy of sectarian parties
November 1958	Coup d'état resulting in the military regime of General Ibrahim Aboud
October 1964	Transitional government led by Khattam al-Khalifa, intended to prepare the country for democratic elections and devise a constitution
June 1965	A general election results in an Umma Party (UP) and National Unionist Party (NUP) coalition. Umma politician Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub becomes Prime Minister
July 1966	Coalition government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, winner of the parliamentary vote
May 1967	Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub replaces Sadiq al-Mahdi
April 1968	Elections return Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub leading the newly formed Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the result of a merger between the NUP and the Popular Democratic Party. A coalition government is formed between the DUP and UP
May 1969	Coup d'état led by Colonel Jaafar Numayri
May 1983	Numayri re-elected, claiming 99.6 per cent of the vote
April 1985	Numayri overthrown by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), led by General Swar al-Dahab
14 April 1985	Sadiq al-Mahdi re-elected, winning 99 of the 301 seats
30 June 1989	Military takeover by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Umar al-Bashir rules with the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hasan el-Turabi
1999	Split in the Popular National Congress (PNC), and breakaway group formed by Turabi, known as the National Popular Congress.

Source: Young et al (2005)



### The Causes of the Conflict in Darfur

Young's (2004) noted that the current conflict has its origins in decades of economic and political marginalization, and tension over increasingly scarce farmland and water resources. Prolonged drought and desertification in northern Darfur pushed nomadic groups south where they came into conflict over water resources with the farming tribes of the centre. Administrative boundary changes imposed by the predominantly Arab regime in Khartoum served to alienate the farming tribes, as did government backing for the loose collection of 'Janjaweed' nomadic militias, which has come to comprise several thousand fighters of mainly Arab extraction. An influx of modern weaponry in recent decades has increased the loss of life in these disputes.

In May 2000, Darfur Islamists published *The Black Book* in which they explained economic marginalization of Darfur and the –region's systematic under-representation in national governments|| of post-independence Sudan. The book –condemned the Islamist promise to Darfur as a sham|| and created the ground for a rebellion against the government (de Waal 2004). In April 2003, two loosely connected rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began attacking the government forces in Darfur. They listed political, economic, and social marginalization of the region as the main causes of the rebellion (Clough 2005: 3; International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005: 23; Baldo 2006; Kindiki 2007: 4).

The rebels came from predominantly –African|| sedentary ethnic groups Fur, Zaghawa and Maasalit (International Crisis Group 2006). The SLM, seen by analysts as a secularist group, was backed by the Fur, the largest ethnic group in Darfur, and some members of the Zaghawa and Masalit. The JEM, seen as an Islamic movement and backed mainly by the Zaghawa, was founded by the Darfur Islamists. Many JEM members have held government posts in the past but broke their relations with the regime when they realized that the government was not going to invest in Darfur's development and care about the wellbeing of its inhabitants (de Waal 2004; Prunier 2005: 121-122; Wadlow 2006: 87-88; International Crisis Group 2007; Mamdani 2007). The rebel claims about the marginalization of Darfur came as the southern and northern Sudanese politicians began negotiations to end the second south-north civil war that started in 1983 and claimed over two million lives (Prunier 2005: 89; Schafer 2007:1).

After three years of negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Sudanese government and southerners in January 2005. The agreement gave the autonomy to the southern region and promised a referendum on self-determination in 2011. The CPA included—power and wealth sharing arrangement aimed at ending decades of political and economic marginalization of the south|| (International Crisis Group 2006a: ii), with half of the revenues from the oil produced in southern Sudan going to the southern regional government (Human Rights Watch 2006; Flint and de Waal 2008:31). Many analysts believe that the Darfur rebellion was –indirectly provoked|| by the negotiations between the government and south (O’Fahey, 2004). The Darfurians felt excluded from the power and revenue- sharing talks. They wanted to pressure the government to negotiate a similar agreement in Darfur and share the wealth with the region. Andrew, N (2008), the United States special envoy to Sudan in 2006-7, claims that John Garang, the late leader of the southern Sudan’s rebel movement, had encouraged the rebels in Darfur to –pressure the government by demanding a power-sharing agreement like the one he was negotiating for the south.|| The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) established that the peace negotiations between the government and south –did in some way represent an example to be followed by other groups, since an armed struggle would apparently lead to fruitful negotiations with the government.||

Between June 2003 and March 2004, a series of three huge combined offensives were launched in northern and western Darfur, including regular army units, the air force, and militia. Hundreds of villages were burned and more than a million people driven from their homes. The SLA and JEM forces were severely defeated. No definitive figures for the numbers of people who died in the war are available. Senior UN officials have given overall estimates of the death toll, the greater proportion attributable to hunger and disease that range as high as 300,000. Diverse sources, including surveys of mortality and compilation of incidents, suggest that a minimum of 35,000 noncombatants were killed in violent attacks during the period of intense hostilities in 2003-04. Forces loyal to the Sudan Government killed most of these, though there were also serious abuses committed by rebel forces.

The ceasefire of April 2004, which coincided with the completion by Sudan Government forces of their largest military operations to date, marked the end of the most severe period of violence and destruction. Dispersed into the desert and

mountains, the SLA and JEM contemplated their options and decided to go on the offensive in eastern and southern Darfur, in areas which had been relatively unaffected. A further period of violence followed between June 2004 and January 2005, in which hundreds of thousands more were displaced and several thousand were killed. The violence and forced displacement unleashed a humanitarian disaster. Surveys estimate that approximately 140,000 people died on account of hunger and disease, possibly more. Before April 2004, humanitarian operations were minimal, largely because of prohibitions on access by the Sudan Government. After this date, humanitarian operations were stepped up and slowly the majority of hungry and displaced people received some relief assistance. Although the levels of violence began to drop, hundreds of thousands more were driven from their homes as the conflict spread into eastern and southern Darfur. Only by the end of 2004 did the mortality rates from hunger and disease begin to drop.

The conflict in Darfur burgeoned when the government of Sudan and its allied militias began what is widely characterized as a campaign of terror against civilians in an effort to crush the rebellion and to punish the core constituencies of the rebels.

At the heart of the current conflict is a struggle for control of political power and resources. The largely nomadic Arab ethnic groups often venture into the traditionally farming communities of Darfur for water and grazing, at times triggering armed conflict between the two groups. Darfur is home to an estimated 7 million people and has more than 30 ethnic groups, which fall into two major categories: African and Arab.

Both communities are Muslim, and years of intermarriages have made racial distinctions difficult, if not impossible. Fighting over resources is one of several factors that has led to intense infighting in Darfur over the years. Many observers believe that the NIF government has systematically and deliberately pursued a policy of discrimination and marginalization of the African communities in Darfur, and has given support to Arab militias to suppress non-Arabs, whom it considers a threat to its hold on power. In 2000, after the ouster of the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-Turabi, and after a split within the Islamist Movement, the government imposed a state of emergency and used its new authority to crackdown on dissidents in Darfur. By 2002, a little-known self-defense force emerged as the SLA, challenging government forces in Darfur.

With the NCP regime internally in turmoil and mounting international pressure to end Sudan's North-South conflict, the SLA and JEM were able to gain the upper hand in the initial phase of the conflict against government forces in early 2003, and appeared well armed and prepared. The rebels also enjoyed the support of the local population, as well as officers and soldiers in the Sudanese army. A significant number of senior officers and soldiers in the Sudanese armed forces come from Darfur. The SLA reportedly benefitted from outside support, including from fellow Zaghawa elements in Chad and financial support from some Darfur businessmen in the Persian Gulf region. In late 2004, another Darfur armed group, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) emerged. Initial reports suggested that the NMRD was created by the government of Sudan in order to undermine the SLA and JEM. In December 2004, the NMRD and the government of Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement in Chad and a month later agreed to cooperate in facilitating the return of refugees from Chad to Darfur. Regional officials and Sudanese opposition figures assert that the NMRD is backed by the government of Chad and that the rebels wear uniforms and carry arms similar to those of the Chadian army (Dagne, 2011).

### **Global Response on the Conflict (2003-2007)**

The Darfur crisis first seized the world's attention in early 2004, just as it seemed that the long-running war and humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan was drawing towards a close. Due to patient political investment in a peace process in Kenya, a peace agreement for Sudan was at last in sight, and it was almost unbearably tragic for a new disaster to unfold just as the enormous tragedy of Southern Sudan appeared to be coming to an end.

International attention to the Darfur Conflict largely began with reports by the advocacy organizations, Amnesty International in July 2003, and the International crises group in December 2003. However wide spread media Coverage did not start until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila who called the Darfur crisis, the –world's greatest humanitarian crisis in March 2004. A movement advocating for humanitarian intervention has emerge in several countries since then.

Gerald Prunier, a scholar specializing in African Conflicts, argues that the world's most powerful countries have largely limited their response to expressions of concern and demands that the UN take action. The UN, lacking both the funding

and military support of the wealthy countries, has left the African Union to deploy a token force (AMIS) without a mandate to protect citizens. In the lack of foreign political will to address the political and economic structures that underline the conflict, the international community has defined the Darfur conflict in humanitarian assistance terms and debated the genocide label.

The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) adopted 26 resolutions since the start out the conflict in Darfur as well as sending constant warnings to the Sudanese government. According to Sarwar, (2009:8-9), the following are the major UNSC resolutions passed:

1. 1556 (2004) – mandated the government of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed militias and bring them to justice. Also imposed arms embargo on non-governmental entities.
2. 1564 (2004) – created an International Commission of Inquiry to report on violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur.
3. 1590 (2005) – established U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
4. 1591 (2005) – called for a ban on offensive military flights over Darfur, extended arms embargo to all in Darfur, and authorized targeted sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze).
5. 1593 (2005) – referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The investigation by the ICC was stonewalled by the Khartoum.
6. 1679 (2006) – called on non-signatories to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) that called for acceleration of transition to U.N. operations in Darfur.
7. 1706 (2006) – mandated the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to take over the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The Sudan government rejected this resolution.
8. 1769 (2007) – established the joint A.U.-U.N. Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
9. 1828 (2008) – extended the mandate of the UNAMID for another year until July 31, 2009.
10. 1881 (2009) – extended the mandate of the UNAMID for one more year.

Although all of these UNSC resolutions were passed, all were extremely difficult to operationalize in Darfur. With the resistance of the Sudanese government and the lack of a U.N. force, or even a unified force, to implement and ensure the changes, the hope of ending the conflict seemed lost. So, while the UNSC made

some great suggestions for ending the conflict in Darfur, they were ineffective overall in ending the genocide Zaremba, (2011).

### **United States**

The United States failed to provide aid and intervene in Darfur; perhaps, due to its political interests. Because of the American government's interest in eliciting information on terrorism from Sudan's intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdullah Gosh, the genocide may have been overlooked. The United States governments released low-estimated death toll therefore served to protect General Gosh rather than making him out to be a war criminal (Hagan, 2008). The United States government has finally succumbed to the mounting pressure to recognize the crisis in Darfur as a genocidal act worthy of international response. Since their decision to intervene, the United States public diplomacy has been at the forefront of international response. —The U.S. then imposed economic sanctions on seven Sudanese individuals and more than 160 companies owned or controlled by the government of Sudan or linked to the militia to increase the pressure on Khartoum to end the violence in Darfur. It has maintained bilateral and multilateral sanctions on the government of Sudan (Zaremba,2011).

In 2005, Rep Henry Hyde (R) and Sen. Sam Brownback (R.Ks) introduced the Darfur Peace and Accountability. Act, which calls on the United States to take a more active role in stopping the alleged genocide, and encourages NATO participation and endorses a chapter VII mandate for a UN mission in Darfur. The bill was passed by the House and senate and as of August 2006. In response to an outcry from human rights activist and Congress, in July 2004 the U.S. State Department mounted an investigation into whether the atrocities in Darfur constituted genocide. The conclusion, announced by Secretary of State Colin Powell on 9 September 2004, was yes. But, to the dismay of activists, Powell went on to say that this did not entail any change in U.S. policy. Instead, he referred the matter to the UN Security Council, which set up its own investigation. This found that there were war crimes and other violations —as heinous as genocide|| but said that the evidence did not support the charge of genocide. The Security Council referred the case to the International Criminal Court, which issued its first indictments in 2007.

U.S. activists first laid the genocide charge on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, gaining impetus from the world's failure to live up to its promise of —never again.|| Certainly, the crimes of the Janjaweed and their

backers seem to fit the Genocide Convention definition of acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic, racial or religious group. But major human rights organizations (including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and humanitarian agencies (such as Medicin Sans Frontieres) have refused to use the term. Their analysis is that Darfur is not the determined attempt to wholly exterminate a group, as with the Holocaust and Rwanda, but rather crimes against humanity committed in the course of a cruel counter-insurgency. Rape, massacre and man-made famine are no less crimes when they are not part of a genocidal campaign, they argue. Moreover, if we describe Darfur as genocide, we must do the same for many other ethnic wars and counter-insurgencies, which is clearly against the spirit of the Genocide Convention.

### **The EU and NATO**

The European Union (E.U.) and the North American Trade Organization (NATO) were the other two main international players in the resolution of the Darfur crisis. The E.U. provided financial backing for the A.U. in its attempts to end the conflict. NATO has provided logistical support for the A.U. mission as well, but refuses to go beyond this role to try to truly induce a resolution. The E.U. and NATO have made it clear that they would not commit their own forces. Therefore, United Nations intervention was necessary to ensure that a coordinated, properly resourced, and legitimate international response to the conflict was implemented.

### **The Arab League**

The Arab League repeatedly failed to condemn the violence in Darfur. Its silence assured the Government of Sudan that it can commit gross violations of human rights with impunity. The League's reluctance to reprimand Khartoum is usually attributed to the fear that any criticism undermines the Arabic Brotherhood. This sentiment is particularly acute in the current political climate.

The Arab League's decision to hold its annual summit in Khartoum in March 2006 further reassured the National Islamic Front junta that it would continue to receive full diplomatic support from its Arab allies. Unsurprisingly the summit failed to effectively address the crisis in Darfur or pledge necessary funds for AMIS. Moreover, Arab League members such as Qatar and Algeria have been instrumental in preventing the UN Security Council from adopting or implementing forceful resolutions against Sudan. Arab states have also

applauded Sudan's rejection of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur. Even non-Arabic states have acquiesced. In previous commentary, the Eritrean Ministry of Information denounced UN peacekeeping operations as a form of neo-colonialism used to perpetuate conflict and provide a source of information and espionage.

The seasoned politician-generals of the Sudanese Government rarely put a tactical foot wrong, but in October 2006 they stumbled. They wrote to African and Arab states, warning them that any contribution to UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur would be considered a hostile act. This uncharacteristically heavy-handed approach undermined some of the unconditional support from Arab states usually enjoyed by Khartoum. Shortly thereafter, a significant editorial by Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid appeared in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*<sup>56</sup>, a Saudi newspaper reflecting the views of the Saudi Royal Family. The piece openly criticized Khartoum for atrocities in Darfur, describing events in the region as worse than Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq combined. Hopefully such criticism will lead to more constructive and effective pressure on Khartoum to put an end to its genocidal campaign. If Arab and Muslim leaders want to prove to the international community that they are truly committed to the principles of justice, accountability and respect for human rights, then it is imperative for them to speak out about the genocide in Darfur, constructively engage in the peace talks between rebel movement and the Sudanese Government and pressure Khartoum to stop killing its own civilians.

However, unless the UN, the EU and the Arab League make clear that neither economic nor political interests are more important than ending the atrocities, the killing in Darfur will go on

### **Canada**

Since 2004 Canada has contributed \$441-million for humanitarian assistance, peace building, and reconstruction, making Canada the fourth largest donor to the Darfur mission (CBC News 2007). Canada has contributed trainers, equipment, vehicles, air transport support, and other technical and logistic assistance. Canada has also provided diplomatic support to the AU's mediation efforts. For the first six months of 2004, international policymakers dithered as to whether to put the North-South peace process on hold while they focused on Darfur, or to consummate that peace and then turn to Darfur. In the end, they chose the latter mainly because it quickly became clear that achieving peace in



Darfur would take a long time, and no-one wanted to risk the progress made in resolving the war in the South. But in the meantime, the activists clamor for action on Darfur mounted.

### **China and Russia Intervention in the Darfur Conflict**

China has recently become more active in pursuing peace in Darfur; but as one of the seven countries that sell weapons to Sudan as well as its largest international oil importer, it certainly could have gotten much more involved. China has been criticized for its non-action by the global community. —It is argued that China could influence the resolution of the Darfur conflict because of its large trade with and investment in Sudan. China has adopted a policy of non-interference in Sudan's domestic affair and its stand on the Darfur issue is that it must be resolved through dialogue and negotiations|| (Sarwar, 2009).

China's support for Khartoum involved a combination of protection and political help. From the early days of the conflict, including the period from 2002 when rebellion crystallized and grew in Darfur, meetings took place between Chinese and senior government officials in Khartoum. China's UN Security Council voting consistently abstained on Darfur resolutions; however, it supported resolutions relating to the CPA and the UN Mission in Sudan supporting the North-South peace process, to which China contributed peacekeeping troops. Moreover, Beijing sought to emphasize its humanitarian assistance and support for peacekeeping before these activities became part of a more concerted diplomatic effort fronted by the special ambassador, Liu Guijin, in 2007. The Chinese government pledged to offer \$610 000 worth of humanitarian aid to Darfur in August 2004, following a trip to Khartoum by China's Special Envoy and Assistant Foreign Minister Lu Guozeng. One area of government support to Sudan from China was military ( Small Arms Survey 2007). This may have stemmed from Beijing's apparent expectation that Khartoum would achieve an early military resolution to the conflict in Darfur. The nature and timing of expanded military links are suggestive. Military relations between China and Sudan were strengthened after 2002 in the wake of a programme of military cooperation.

At this time, Khartoum was attempting to crush the Darfur uprising while simultaneously negotiating with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to end the long- standing war with the south. Following an exploratory trip to Beijing by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Chief of Staff Abbas Arabi Abdalla in March 2002, a fully-fledged military meeting took place in June. Abdalla and the

Sudanese defence minister Bekri Hasan Salih met separately with a high level Chinese military delegation led by Du Tiehuan, political commissar of the Beijing Military Region (Sudanese Defense Minister, Chief of General Staff Meet with Visiting Chinese Military Delegation' 2002). President Hu Jintao's visit reportedly saw him comment on the importance of peace and unity among peoples for the development of Sudan. President Hu's meeting with President Bashir considered Darfur. Chinese public statements about the need for a comprehensive ceasefire 'and an acceleration of the political negotiation process involving rebel non-signatories to the Abuja Accord, plus the need for humanitarian assistance, were revealing. The Chinese government committed RMB 40 million as aid for Darfur. President Hu is reported to have told President Bashir that 'Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem' (McDoom, 2007).

On 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council, under the presidency of China, passed Resolution 1769 establishing the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. The occasion was accompanied by Chinese claims of playing a key role in overcoming the opposition of President Bashir. This resolution represented a new chapter in ongoing attempts to respond to the conflict in Darfur, but China's support had followed as part of a process whereby changes in diplomacy were evident in a number of areas, some of which continue to be apparent.

China abstained in the vote when the UN No. 1556 and No. 1557 resolution for sanctioning Sudan listed the oil industry as one of the sanctioned targets. In such a case, China often runs into a dilemma between international justice and overseas interests, which is resulted from the great challenge posed on China's diplomacy by its increased over seas interests.

Beijing has promoted a dual-track process of AU-UN peacekeeping and an uncertain political process of attempting a negotiated settlement. As a Chinese spokesman said, 'The international society could push forward the peace-keeping and political processes in balance, help improve the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur and finally push forward the comprehensive and proper solution to the issue' (China Supports UN's Efforts on Darfur, FM Spokesperson' 2007). China's being at one with the international community in agreeing on the importance of the political process can be viewed as an attempt to narrow the distance between China and America in particular and consequently reduce exposure. However, it also resonated with a fundamental

issue facing attempts to facilitate movement on addressing possible solutions in the light of the failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

Russia and China have been quite friendly with Khartoum: they have publicly expressed reservations over the indictment of Al-Bashir, have potentially supplied arms and military equipment to the government, and have opposed sanctions. Both countries are highly interested in Sudanese oil and are generally reluctant to intervene in other countries affairs; therefore, they will likely oppose any resolution that limits the export of the region's resources. With that in mind, Russia and China, but particularly the latter, do not wish to be seen as obstinately blocking progress and are thus likely willing to compromise and unlikely to take extreme hard-line stances Meulen and Putten(2009).

Russia had supplied arms to Sudan in 2008. They hold strong political and economic relationships with Sudan, and strongly support the territorial integrity of Sudan, opposing the independence of Darfur. Protecting their own interests in Sudan, Russia claimed in the UN Security Council that —the human suffering in Darfur was insufficient to provoke serious reflection on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens|| (Bellamy and Williams 2006: 150). Despite continued fighting and atrocities in Darfur, the Security Council was —prevented from enacting stiffer sanctions [on Sudan] due to resistance from China and Russia|| (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Based on our analysis above, we can see that China and Russia purposely delayed the UN in taking action in the Darfur crisis. This was done by China and Russia through their vetoing the various Security Council resolutions on Darfur in order to protect their economic interests in Sudan and not to betray their trust with the Government of Sudan. With the above analysis we have validated our first hypothesis that states that there is a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan.

### **United Nation Security Council Resolution 1769**

Noting the AMIS resource deficiencies, the deteriorating security conditions in Darfur, and the threats of some AMIS member states to withdraw participation (Africa Action, 2007), the international community began to unite more firmly around the idea of collective intervention in 2006. Prompted by threats to international peace and security, Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the UK, Tanzania and the US co-sponsored a resolution on a UN

peacekeeping force that would send 17 300 military and 3 300 civilian police personnel to Darfur as a Chapter VII mission. The aim of the resolution was to reinforce the AMIS effort and reduce the large-scale violence in Darfur (UN 2006). Two main factors doomed it to failure. First, several states – China, Russia and Qatar – abstained, arguing that the 22 000-strong UN force would be a violation of Sudanese sovereignty.

The abstention of these states, in particular China which has strong economic ties with Sudan, reduced international pressure on Sudan to comply with the resolution. Second, the resolution used language that allowed Sudan to opt out of compliance, as it stated that it would invite the consent ‘of the host government, a consent that President Omar Al-Bashir ultimately withheld, likening any UN force to ‘Western colonization’ (Bloomfield, 2006). The move towards intervention therefore failed.

Since the abstentions in August 2006, international response has been aimed at addressing the reservations that China, Russia and Sudan had about the potential peacekeeping response. The outcome was Resolution 1769, which unanimously passed on 31 July 2007 and calls for the creation of an AU-UN hybrid force that will replace the AMIS force with UNAMID. The Resolution authorizes a force with the following characteristics and responsibilities: The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1769 by unanimous vote on July 31, 2007. It determined that the situation in Darfur constitutes a threat to peace, and authorized the deployment of a United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID will be the largest United Nations multilateral peacekeeping force ever deployed, with a total presence of more than 31,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel.

### **UNAMID’S Mission**

The resolution mandates that UNAMID’s initial mission is to:

1. Restore security to allow continued humanitarian assistance;
2. Protect civilians;
3. Monitor ceasefire agreements signed since 2004;
4. Help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement;
5. Ensure an inclusive political process and support AU-UN efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; and
6. Monitor and report on the presence of any illegal weapons in violation of the Darfur arms embargo.

In addition, Resolution 1769 provides long-term missions for UNAMID, including:

1. Provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
2. Promote human rights and basic freedoms; promote the rule of law by strengthening independent judiciary, prison system and development of legal framework ;and
3. Monitor the security situation at borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

In addition, UNAMID will have the authority to –take the necessary action|| to: support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan, and Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.

### **UNAMID’S Structure & Deployment**

The UN recruited military personnel and observers, civilian officials, equipment, logistical support, and funding support for deployment of UNAMID. It consisted of 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each. A UNAMID troop is predominantly from African countries, with contributions from other countries if African nations are unable to meet the force requirements within the timeline laid out for deployment.

UNAMID incorporated the roughly 7,400 current African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel and the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS. UNAMID will have a single chain of command, and the UN will provide all command and control structures and backstopping. The UN Security Council appointed Rodolphe Adada as AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Martin Agwai as Force Commander.

While full deployment of UNAMID is not expected until mid-2008, there are three immediate deployment deadlines:

1. UN Member States are to finalize their contributions by August 31. No later than October 2007, UNAMID will establish an operations headquarters and be ready to take command of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and cover the cost of AMIS troops.
2. As soon as possible and no later than December 31, 2007 UNAMID assumed authority from AMIS.

The largest UN mission ever, UNAMID is estimated to cost roughly \$2.5 billion a year, plus start-up costs. UN member states were expected to fund the mission through the UN assessment scale. The United States was equally expected to contribute 27.1%.

**Table 4.1 Evolution of the UNAMID Deployment**

	Military Personnel	Police Personnel	Total	Percentage
April	7,521	1,716	9,237	35%
August	8,492	1,845	10,337	39%
December	12,369	2,767	15,136	58%

Source: Laurie, W. M. (2009) UNAMID: A Case Study

Further, according to the Resolution, details on the force's mandate were drawn from the 5 June 2007 meeting between the Secretary-General and the AU Commission (AU 2007) and the resulting report. The following other tasks can be deduced from paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Resolution:

- i. Help restore security conditions for economic development, provide humanitarian assistance and return IDPs;
- ii. Protect civilian populations under imminent threat of violence and prevent attacks against civilians;
- iii. Monitor and observe compliance with the Darfur Peace Agreement Assist with the political process;
- iv. Promote respect for and protection of human rights and the rule of law in Darfur; Monitor and report on the security situation in Chad and the Central African Republic; and
- v. Monitor, verify and report on efforts to disarm the Janjaweed

The peacekeeping force was tasked with supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, an ambitious agreement that calls for the disarming and demobilization of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese Government of National

Unity; the integration of former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces; upholding of the right of the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their regional status; and the establishment of protective buffer zones around IDP camps (Darfur Peace Agreement 2006). The resolution calls for unity of command and control and for the UN to be responsible for command and control structures. The hybrid force is expected to protect personnel, facilities and installations, and to facilitate the deployment of light and heavy support packages, which include signals and communications units, logistics support, helicopters and tactical military staff (IRIN 2007). Ambitious in its goals, the resolution appears to represent genuine interest in improving human security in Darfur.

### **Factors That Inhibited UNAMID'S Functions In Darfur Caused By The Government Of Sudan**

This part study the challenges encounter by UN during intervention. Khartoum systematically impeded UNAMID's deployment at every turn. To date, regime officials have taken the following actions:

- i. refused to lease all necessary land to the UN and provide access to scarce water resources, deterring construction of necessary new bases and expansion of those the AU forces are already using; denied the UN full and uninhibited use of airports in Darfur and limited night flight access, impeding the rapid deployment of troops and equipment;
- ii. refused permission to the UN to upgrade runways, ensuring that large cargo planes carrying critical heavy equipment are unable to land;
- iii. delayed approval of visa requests by UN personnel; and
- iv. Stated ever more insistently that non-African forces are not needed in Darfur.

In late December 2007, UNAMID officially assumed command and control from the African Union peacekeeping force. The United Nations continues to face serious obstacles in force deployment in large part due to restrictions imposed by the Government of National Unity (GONU). The Government signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United Nations in February 2008. The

Government, however, continues to reject non-African countries, including offers from Thailand, Nepal, and Norway.

According to Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, –authorization for the deployment of six helicopters to El-Fashir had not been obtained as yet, and UNAMID had not been given permission to fly at night.||

The government of Sudan continues to insist on having the authority to –temporarily disable the communications network|| of UNAMID during Government security operations. The Government is also demanding that UNAMID provide advance notification of movements. UNAMID also faces logistical difficulties, in part due to lack of helicopters.

In January 2008, a UNAMID supply convoy was attacked by Sudanese government forces in West Darfur.

From the analysis above, we can see that the UNAMID which is a hybrid creation of both the UN and AU did try to maintain peace between the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, but was constrained by many factors as have enumerated and explained above. This was as a result of the actions taken by the government of Sudan in inhibiting the progress of the UNAMID and the inactions or failure of members of the UN in meeting up with some of their promises and pledges they made, thereby validating our second hypothesis which states that; the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the UNAMID did not facilitate the total resolution of the conflict in Darfur.

## **SUMMARY**

We started this paper by looking at the challenges before African states which is how to grapple with a variety of the complex political, economic, environmental and social conflicts that have arisen in an unprecedented manner in the various parts of Africa. The challenges of neo-colonialism which has rippled and dovetailed with a series of devastating intra-state conflicts since the 1960 poses a lot of concern. Africa is one of the worst victims of violent conflicts in the world. Many states have been battered and collapsed as a result of the many fratricidal wars, intractable political conflicts and economic insolvency.

We equally looked at the UN Security Council role in trying to resolve these conflicts before narrowing our discussion to the conflict in Darfur region in western Sudan. Especially on the underlying factors that informed China and Russia's delay in adopting UN Security Council resolution towards resolving the



conflict in Darfur and the mechanism used UNAMID in the management of the Darfur crisis.

In our statement of problem, we raised the following questions: Is there a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan? And, did the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the UNAMID facilitate the resolution of the conflict in Darfur? We hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN and the protection of economic interest of China and Russia in Sudan; and that, the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the UNAMID did not facilitate the total resolution of the conflict in Darfur. We then went on to review some literatures where we discovered our gap and which tried to fill in the preceding chapters.

In our findings, we discovered that a positive relationship between the delayed response of the UN in the Darfur crisis and the protection of economic interests by two members of the UN Security Council which are China and Russia. We equally discovered that even though the UNAMID the is a joint effort by the UN and AU to resolve the Darfur crisis made some remarkable effort in calming the situation, it however failed to bring lasting peace to the Darfur crisis as there were so many constraints which it could not surmount as discussed in the preceding chapters. In other words, we noted that the UN peacekeeping mission in conjunction with the AU peacekeeping mission which became known as the UNAMID was unable to maintain a cease fire and help resolve the conflict as a result of failure in planning, logistic logjam, and the moves made by the Government of Sudan to frustrate the efforts of UNAMID in achieving their mission. We then conclude the study and made some recommendations below.

## **CONCLUSION**

Darfur is home to a multi-ethnic population that has long experienced severe social, economic, infrastructure, and environmental challenges, exacerbated by policies that have undermined the region's potential. This, in part, led to conflict over control of power, land and natural resources, and to the outbreak of war.

Massive displacement, destruction of infrastructure, loss of life, property, and livelihoods, blockage of nomadic roots, violence, and other war-related factors fractured the social structure of Darfur and weakened traditional peace and reconciliation mechanisms.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which aimed to end the conflict in Darfur, did not secure consensus among all parties affected by the conflict as the conflict continued leading to the loss of more lives and the destruction of properties.

The African Union in its attempt to resolve the crisis established the African Peacekeeping mission to Sudan (AMIS). AMIS could still not perform its functions as a result of failure in planning, logistic logjam, and the moves made by the Government of Sudan to frustrate its efforts. This made the UN Security Council to pass resolution 1769 thereby taking over the peacekeeping operation from African Union in a hybrid merger of the AMIS with the UN forces to become the UNAMID even though the peacekeeping force still retain an overwhelmingly African character and outlook. Even though so many of the resolutions which were aimed at bringing solution to the Darfur crisis were vetoed by two of the permanent members of the UN Security Council which are China and Russia due to the economic interests and investments in Sudan and their political affiliation to the Government of Sudan.

Not until China came under international threats, especially by the International Olympic Committee that she had to persuade the Government of Sudan to allow the deployment of UN Peacekeeping troops to join forces with the African Union Peace Mission to at least maintain the cease fire agreement while political solutions were being sought to the Darfur crisis. Even with the formation of UNAMID, the ceasefire could still not be maintain and the conflict could still not be resolve as a result of the obstacles place in place by government of Sudan and the lack of commitment of the international community who fail to acton time and when they eventually did, could not redeem their pledges on time. This delayed the deployment of UNAMID and obstructed its functions. Bearing this in mind, we then give some recommendations.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

In our recommendation, we adopted some of the recommendation proposed by the African Union (AU) Peace Committee set up by the AU to look into the future Darfur crisis.

The Government of Sudan, the Armed Movements, and other armed groups and militia, individually or collectively, should agree to and negotiate a Suspension of Hostilities (SH) to create an environment conducive to the dialogue to conclude a Framework Agreement (FA) and a Global Political Agreement (GPA). The

principal goal of the Suspension of Hostilities Agreement will be the immediate suspension of all armed action and related activities.

As articulated in previous agreements, the Parties would do everything within their power to ensure that: Violence is reduced; Civilians are protected and not subjected to violence, intimidation, threats or forced displacement, and that the protection of women and children is given the highest priority; Humanitarian assistance is provided safely to IDPs and other civilians in need; An environment that would enable IDPs and refugees to return voluntarily and safely to their places of origin is created; The Parties co-operate with UNAMID and its verification bodies in monitoring the suspension of hostilities.

Simultaneously with the processes of negotiating a suspension of hostilities with the armed groups, the Government of Sudan should take unilateral steps to reduce violence in Darfur. These steps would include: the consolidation of command and control over the security organs operational in Darfur; the strengthening of the Sudan Police Force; the accelerated establishment of community police services for IDPs and people returning to villages and cooperation with UNAMID monitoring activities.

UNAMID should extend non-military logistical assistance to the relevant Armed Movements and provide training and capacity building in ceasefire and related operations to the commanders of Armed Movements. This assistance and training would be extended to all groups that agree to suspend hostilities.

We urge troop contributing countries and other UN Member States to provide, without further delays, the balance of forces and assets, which are considered indispensable for the Mission to fulfill its mandate to protect civilians.

We Note the continuing difficulty that UNAMID is experiencing in obtaining essential assets which were promised by the UN Security Council. In particular, although attack helicopters were approved in April 2007, it is only Ethiopia that provided theirs early. We recommend that the required assets, including helicopters, be provided.

Given that a large proportion of UNAMID activities relate to police work, we propose that the civilian police component of UNAMID be further strengthened, including accelerating the tasks of training for community police services for IDPs in camps and those returning to their villages of origin.

It is possible to reform and regulate the security sector in a way that ensures that it is genuinely representative, accountable, impartial, and trusted if the following arrangements are guaranteed:

- Government of Sudan authorities cease distributing arms and other support they are providing to Janjaweed and other militias and instead work to immediately disarm Arab militias.
- Government of Sudan authorities should prohibit all security sectors from recruiting persons younger than eighteen-yearsold.

The roles the police, army, and national security forces should play to enforce the law include:

- Collaborating with UNAMID to protect IDP in the camps, particularly at night.
- Disarming militias with clear engagement of UNAMID.
- Increasing the number of police personnel patrolling all IDP camps to improve the security situation and deploying more police and military forces in areas of IDP and refugee return and other areas where vulnerable people reside.

A genuine commitment from all parties should guide negotiations on disarmament and arms control in Darfur. The United Nations should resume control of monitoring disarmament and arms control and put the necessary pressure on the Government of Sudan to comply.

In order to reinforce the work of UNAMID to meet the needs of the people of Darfur:

- a) Troop contributing countries and other UN Member States should expeditiously provide the balance of forces and assets, including helicopters, required for UNAMID's protection work;
- b) The varied civilian component of UNAMID's role should be further strengthened; UNAMID should be given the authority to coordinate international humanitarian efforts in Darfur;
- c) UNAMID should play a central part in implementing and monitoring relevant aspects of the GPA

We equally recommend that China and Russia should not because of economic interests and investments in Sudan continue to support the atrocities being committed against helpless civilians in Darfur, especially on women and children who are being killed, maimed or rendered homeless in many parts of the region. In other words, China and Russia should use their position as permanent

members with veto power to help bring peace and security to Darfur, which is the major aim of establishing the UN and the Security Council. Because, apart from arms sale, they stand a chance of making more gains in other investments when it is done in a peaceful and secured environment in Darfur and other regions or states in Sudan.

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